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Abstract 
Effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts depend on comprehensive risk 
assessments that consider potential hazard events and social vulnerability. The Lake 
Nyos Disaster (LND) caused the deaths of about 1,700 people, forced another 4,000 
people from their homes, and left survivors more vulnerable to future hazards. There is 
considerable research on the gas hazard and some work on local vulnerability; 
however studies rarely consider both aspects of disaster risk (DR). This study 
addresses both the hazard and vulnerability and uses qualitative and quantitative 
methods that are applied for the first time to LND survivor vulnerability and gas 
hazard. Interviews, participant observation, the Pressure and Release (PAR) and 
Access models are used to analyze vulnerability. A modified LAHARZ model and 
GIS mapping are used to categorize the gas hazard. By modeling various gas release 
scenarios and determining the main factors affecting vulnerability, DR for survivors in 
the Nyos area is calculated. 
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1. Introduction 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is being increasingly recognized as an important 
development goal in many countries as well as in international and intergovernmental 
organizations. Natural hazards are complex problems which are happening more 
frequently due to increased exposure to hazards, increased vulnerability in urban areas, 
global climate change, and other reasons. It is because of the continually growing risk 
of natural hazards that both hazard and vulnerability assessments are becoming 
increasingly significant to DRR efforts. A comprehensive risk assessment considers the 
full range of potential disaster events and the underlying drivers that contribute to 
vulnerability. It may start with the analysis of historical events and influences, as well 
as incorporating forward-looking perspectives and integrating the anticipated impacts 
of phenomena that are altering historical trends such as climate change. It is well 
recognized that risk is not static and that it can change very rapidly as a result of 
evolving hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. This is why it is vital to consider all of 
these factors when defining disaster risk. 
Disasters are the combination of one or more hazards and human behaviors and 
actions. A disaster is defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community 
or society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses 
and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
with using its own resources.” (UNISDR, 2017). Disasters can be evaluated as the 
product of long term processes which create risk over many years, decades, or longer. 
According to Wisner et al. (2004), disaster risk is the result of the interaction of one or 
more hazards with a vulnerable population. A disaster cannot occur without both of 
these dynamics. There is no disaster if there is a hazard but no vulnerable population or 
if there is a vulnerable population but no hazard event. A population is vulnerable when 
their characteristics and situation influence their capacity to anticipate, resist, cope 
with, and recover from the impacts of a natural hazard (Wisner et al., 2004). Natural 
hazards are extreme natural events and processes which are categorized by their 
varying degrees of severity and frequency. 
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The 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) significantly impacted the populations 
living in the affected areas.  The lake experienced a limnic eruption and released a 
cloud of CO₂ into the valleys around the lake. The disaster killed over 1,700 people, 
displaced more than 4,000, and killed many domestic and wild animals (Tuttle et al., 
1987). Survivors were evacuated, after which aid and mitigation efforts began. There 
have been many studies done on the LND focusing mainly on the hazard’s origin, 
trigger, and the composition and structure of the gas and water in the lake. However, 
less research has been devoted to the exposure, risk, and social vulnerability of those 
affected.  
This study aims to understand disaster risk in the Lake Nyos area by looking at 
the effects of the gas hazard and socially produced vulnerability on the populations 
affected by the LND. Hazard and vulnerability assessments were produced for this 
study. Data was gathered from interviews, participant observation, review of literature, 
and satellite imagery. The theoretical frameworks and models used to analyze the 
hazard and vulnerability include the Pressure and Release model, Access model, an 
adapted LAHARZ model, and ArcMap. The object of this study is to determine the 
disaster risk for LND survivors in the Lake Nyos area, as well as understand the 
impacts of various gas release scenarios. It will also be determined how a risk 
assessment based on these methods could inform policy and DRR efforts in the Nyos 
area. Hazard and vulnerability assessment studies such as this can be used to establish 
priorities when addressing hazards and vulnerability. 
 
1.1 Geological Setting and Study Location 
Cameroon is located on the west coast of Africa, on the Gulf of Guinea, and sits 
on a line of young (Tertiary to Recent) volcanic activity which trends NE-SW across 
Cameroon (Schlüter, 2008). This line of volcanism is the Cameroon Volcanic Line 
(CVL) which extends for 1,600km from the island of Pagalu (aka Annobón), in the 
Atlantic Ocean, through the Gulf of Guinea, and along the Cameroon-Nigeria border 
(Fitton, 1980). The geography of Cameroon varies greatly across the country’s 
475,440km2 (CIA, 2017). The country includes a variety of climatic zones ranging from 
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tropical rainforests to hot semi-arid climates (Sahel). Due to its diverse climates and 
varied geology, Cameroon is exposed to a wide variety of climatological, geological, 
biological, and ecological hazards. Some of the most well-known natural hazard events 
in Cameroon have been caused by Mount Cameroon, a stratovolcano in the Southwest 
Region, and by Lake Monoun in the West Region and Lake Nyos in the Northwest 
Region.  
The landscape of the Northwest Region of Cameroon is defined by features of 
the CVL. There are old cinder cones, lava flows, and many crater lakes which have 
formed in the circular maars caused by volcanic explosions (Kling et al., 1987; Tuttle et 
al., 1987). Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun also sit on the CVL and contain high 
concentrations of carbon dioxide. Large emissions of CO₂ have occurred at each of 
these lakes, at Lake Monoun in August 1984 and at Lake Nyos in August 1986 (Kling 
et al., 1987). The 1986 LND caused the deaths of over 1,700 people in the villages of 
Nyos, Cha, Subum, as well as the surrounding areas. This study focuses on the hazard 
that caused this disaster, the vulnerability of the people affected by it, and the disaster 
risk constructed by these factors. 
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Figure 1: Location map for Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun and other features along the 
CVL (Ohba et al., 2013). 
 
Lake Nyos, located approximately 500km by road from Cameroon’s capital of 
Yaoundé, is a crater lake in Menchum Division. The lake is 208m at its deepest point. 
Underlying basement rock has distinct fault lines running through it, which have been 
active in the area’s recent history (Freeth & Rex, 2000; Kling, 1987). The Nyos maar 
was formed by volcanic explosions and the collapse of adjacent rocks (Tuttle et al., 
1987). Beneath the maar is a diatreme, or an approximately vertical tube that formed 
above a dike and is packed with disjointed rock fragments and ash (Kling et al., 1987). 
The CO₂ present in the lake is released by the melting of the metasomatized mantle 
deep below the lake and seeps into the bottom waters of the lake dissolved in 
groundwater (Aka, 2015; Kling et al., 1987; Nojiri et al., 1993). Based on 
measurements and evidence collected after the 1986 event by the USGS and 
5 
corroborated by subsequent studies, it was determined that Lake Nyos still posed a 
threat to the surrounding communities because there remained the potential for gas 
eruptions in the future (Lockwood & Rubin, 1989; Nojiri et al., 1993; Tuttle et al., 
1987). This led to the evacuation of the area and the relocation of the inhabitants into 
resettlement camps outside of the disaster zone: Buabua, Esu, Ipalim, Kimbi, Kumfutu, 
Upkwa, and Yemnge.  
The area of interest (AOI) is located on the border of the Menchum and Boyo 
Divisions in the Northwest Region of Cameroon, 120km north of Bamenda, the 
region’s capital (Figure 2). Menchum Division (4,469km²) and Boyo Division 
(1,592km²), of which Wum and Fundong are the divisional headquarters respectively, 
have a total population of about 325,000 people. These divisions are made up mostly of 
rural agricultural communities with only a few large economic and political centers. 
There are many small communities in Menchum and Boyo Divisions and their 
populations are concentrated in small communities that are widely dispersed across the 
divisions. The villages of Nyos and Cha and the resettlement camps of Upkwa, Esu, 
Ipalim, Kumfutu, and Yemnge are in Menchum Division, while the village of Subum 
and the resettlement camps of Kimbi and Buabua are in Boyo Division. Subsistence 
farming, cattle grazing, and petty trading are the primary occupations of the majority of 
community members. 
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Figure 2: Study location, AOI (red line) and the locations of Cha, Nyos, Subum, and 
Buabua (green points). 
 
1.2 Overview of Recent Socio-economic and Political History of 
Cameroon  
The Republic of Cameroon has a population of about 23 million and is known 
for its cultural and environmental diversity (CIA, 2017). Often called “Africa in 
miniature”, French and English are the official languages of Cameroon though West 
African Pidjin English and at least 240 national languages are also spoken (Biloa & 
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Echu, 2008; Republic of Cameroon, 2018). The country is divided into ten 
administrative regions, the Extreme-North, North, Adamawa, East, Center, South, 
Littoral, West, Southwest, and Northwest. Cameroon ranks 153rd out of 188 countries 
on the global human development index (HDI) scale putting the country in the low 
human development category (UNDP, 2016). The 2015 HDI for Cameroon, 0.518, is 
below the 0.523 average HDI for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; however it is above 
the 0.497 average of countries in the low human development category (UNDP, 2016). 
The Southwest and Northwest Regions are anglophone and the rest of the 
regions are francophone. There are more than 240 ethno-linguistic groups in Cameroon 
that are part of the three main language groups, the Bantu, the Semi-Bantu, and the 
Sudanese (Republic of Cameroon, 2018). A variety of religions are practiced in 
Cameroon, the two most prevalent being Christianity and Islam. Many people practice 
animism and other traditional belief systems in conjunction with their Christian, 
Islamic, or other non-traditional beliefs.  
In the 15th century, Portuguese traders established contact with the area that is 
now Cameroon and though no permanent settlements were maintained, slaves were 
purchased from the local peoples (Worger et al., 2010). In 1884, the region came under 
German rule after protectorate treaties were negotiated with local chiefs (Hargreaves, 
1990). This region was invaded by French and British forces during WWI. After the 
war, former German-controlled Cameroon was divided between the United Kingdom 
and France (Hargreaves, 1990). 
In 1946, the recognition of emerging political parties established a basis for 
Cameroonian nationalism (Atangana, 2010; Lewis, 1965; Ndille & Rose, 2016; Worger 
et al., 2010). The Union of Cameroon Peoples (UPC), one of the many emerging 
parties, demanded immediate reunification of British-controlled Cameroon and French-
controlled Cameroon along with eventual independence (Konings, 1996, 1999; 
Stevenson, 2008). In 1957, the French government created the autonomous state of 
Cameroon basing its government on French parliamentary democracy. In 1958, the 
Legislative Assembly of Cameroon voted to gain independence by 1960 and obtained 
full internal autonomy in 1959. Ahmadou Ahidjo became prime minister of French-
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controlled Cameroon and John Foncha became prime minister of British-controlled 
Cameroon. Soon Foncha and Ahidjo were discussing the possibility of unification upon 
attaining independence (Achankeng, 2015; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). 
On January 1, 1960, Cameroon became an independent republic and in April 
1960, Ahidjo's UPC party won a majority and Ahidjo, who ran unopposed, was elected 
president. During 1960, discussions between Foncha and Ahidjo continued, and a 
future federation was tentatively outlined. In 1961, a vote organized by the United 
Nations was held in British-controlled Cameroon and the people chose either to be part 
of the independent Nigerian state or to be reunified with the independent Republic of 
Cameroon. The predominantly Muslim northern section of British-controlled Cameroon 
voted to join Nigeria and the largely Christian southern section voted to join the 
Republic of Cameroon, which then became the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997, 2003). The previously British-controlled part of 
Cameroon became known as West Cameroon and the French part as East Cameroon. 
Ahidjo accepted the federation, considering it a stepping stone towards full 
reunification (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). The federal constitution was adopted, with 
Ahidjo as president and Foncha as vice president. Buea became the capital of West 
Cameroon, while Yaoundé doubled as the federal capital and the capital of East 
Cameroon (Figure 3). East Cameroon and West Cameroon retained substantial 
autonomy and continued following the rules and laws of their respective colonizers 
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). 
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Figure 3: Map of regional capitals in Cameroon. Map provided courtesy of the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (Retrieved from 
https://reliefweb.int/map/cameroon/cameroon-location-map-2013). 
 
In 1972, a new constitution replaced the federation with a unitary state called 
the United Republic of Cameroon (Figure 4). In 1975, Paul Biya was appointed vice 
president. Ahidjo resigned as president in 1982 and was constitutionally succeeded by 
Biya. Ahidjo later regretted his choice of successor and in a coup in 1984, his 
supporters failed to overthrow Biya (Akum, 2009). Biya won single-candidate elections 
in 1983 and 1984 and the country returned to being named the Republic of Cameroon. 
According to the U.S. Department of State Cameroon Human Rights Reports from 
2011 and 2017, Biya has remained in power, winning non-transparent multiparty 
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elections in 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. His Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Movement (CPDM) party continues to hold a sizeable majority in the legislature. 
 
     
Figure 4: Cameroon's changing borders throughout recent history.  "Cameroon 
boundary Changes" by Roke is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. 
 
Politically, Cameroon is a republic in which the presidency has a central role in 
terms of political power and has control over all branches of the government 
(Department of State, 2017). Although the country has a multiparty system, the CPDM 
has remained in power since its foundation in 1985. Paul Biya has been president of 
Cameroon since 1982 (Department of State, 2017). The government of Cameroon is 
centralized, each subsequent level of government has less and less decision making 
power; most decisions for villages, subdivisions, divisions, etc. are made at higher 
presiding levels (Bang, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
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2. Background 
2.1 Previous Work 
The LND inspired many scientists and researchers to delve into various aspects 
of the disaster, hazard, and its effects. The largest portion of these studies focus on the 
hazard’s origin, trigger mechanism, and the composition and structure of the gas and 
water in the lake. Initial studies conducted on the disaster and its origin detailed the 
extent of the gas flow and found that the gas released was primarily CO₂ originating 
from a deep-seated magmatic source beneath the lake (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter 
et al., 1989; Morin & Pahai, 1986; Tuttle et al., 1987). The chemical and medical 
evidence from investigations conducted after the disaster showed that the victims died 
of CO₂ asphyxiation (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989; Kling et al., 1987). It 
was also determined that although the CO₂ is originating from a magmatic source, the 
release of gas was not directly caused by volcanic activity (Aka, 2015; Tuttle et al., 
1987).  
In order to better understand the hazard, researchers considered the trigger 
mechanism that caused the eruption as well as the composition of the gas and lake 
stratification. Studies considered internal and external mechanisms such as landslides, 
turnover, volcanic eruptions, seasonal mixing and density inversion (Chau et al., 1996; 
Cotel, 1999; Kling et al., 1987; Kling et al., 1994; Touret et al., 2010; Tuttle et al., 
1987). Little consensus exists on the exact trigger mechanism for the 1986 gas release, 
though a small landslide is often cited as a possible cause. It is, however, usually agreed 
upon that a disruption of the lake’s stratification decreased pressure on the bottom 
layers and released the gas (Kling et al., 1987; Tuttle et al., 1987). Additionally, 
subsequent studies found that gas continues to accumulate in the bottom water of the 
lake, creating a potential hazard (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994; Nojiri et al., 
1993). Sano et al. (1990), Nojiri et al. (1993), and Kusakabe et al. (2000) all found that 
though there was a continuous influx of CO₂ into the lake, the gas build-up process is 
not dominated by a steady-state flux and that this makes it difficult to estimate how 
often degassing events might occur.  
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Numerous studies considering mitigation approaches and various modeling 
techniques examine possible hazard reduction strategies. Degassing the lake was 
suggested immediately after the LND and was followed up with studies investigating 
the safety of possible procedures and methods (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994; 
Kling et al., 1987; Kling et al., 1994; Kusakabe et al., 2000; Tuttle et al., 1987). Later, 
Schmid et al. (2006) also examined CO₂ concentrations and stratification in the lake to 
determine the effect of the degassing mitigation strategy. Results showed that without 
degassing the CO₂ would reach levels as high as or higher than pre-disaster levels. 
Mapping and modeling of the LND gas flow was done after the disaster in order 
to assist possible mitigation efforts (McCord & Schladow, 1998; Pierret et al., 1992). 
More recently studies attempting to model the LND and possible future gas releases 
been done using a variety of computer and weather prediction modeling techniques 
(Burton et al., 2017; Costa & Chiodini, 2015; Folch et al., 2017). These models have 
variable levels of success in matching the dispersion pattern of the gas during the LND. 
The mapping and modeling studies, along with considering possible mitigation efforts, 
also investigate exposure. Work done shortly after and since the disaster probes into 
risk due to exposure to the hazard (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989; Le 
Guern et al., 1992; Tchindjang, 2018). These studies consider risk based mainly on 
physical exposure and less on vulnerability and how that affects the disaster risk. The 
survivors’ vulnerability at the time of the disaster was examined by Shanklin (1988, 
1989) and Le Guern et al. (1992). Their studies found that many survivors lost their 
livelihoods and social support networks in the disaster. Bang (2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2016) has delved deeper into social vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area than 
many of his predecessors. He also conducted a study on social vulnerability in the Lake 
Nyos area using the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. This framework however does 
not equally consider the hazard and vulnerability, both of which are important aspects 
of DR. Bang’s work has shown that the people’s vulnerability and the disaster risk in 
the area are formed by a variety of factors and stresses the importance of addressing 
more than the physical hazard. 
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2.2 The 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) 
2.2.1 The Event 
On the night of August 21st 1986, a limnic eruption occurred at Lake Nyos, 
which released a dense cloud of CO₂ into the surrounding valleys (Kling et al., 1987). 
The gas mainly affected the villages of Nyos, Cha, and Subum and the surrounding 
areas. The disaster caused the deaths of over 1,700 people and displaced more than 
4,000 others (Tuttle et al., 1987). Livestock and local fauna were also significantly 
impacted, about 3,500 cattle died as well as many other domesticated and wild animals 
(Tuttle et al., 1987). This was a significant loss for the people living in the area since 
agriculture and cattle grazing were the main livelihoods for a substantial portion of the 
population. In a single night many people living in the Nyos area lost both their 
livelihoods and their families. 
The morning after the disaster people from neighboring villages, outside the 
affected area, discovered that something had happened and began to assist survivors. 
The area was evacuated; survivors who were able fled the area while others were 
assisted by people from neighboring, unaffected villages, missions, and the 
government. It took longer for a formal response because of the area’s relative isolation 
and distance from cities with suitable resources. The government and NGO responders 
arrived a few days after the disaster and, over the next days and weeks, finished 
evacuating the area and burying the dead. 
 
2.2.2 Response and Management 
Disaster management in Cameroon is very centralized (Bang, 2012, 2014). The 
response and management of the LND started at the national level with a presidential 
decree creating a National Committee for the Reception and Management of Relief 
Aid. Then a ministerial decree created provincial committees, one in Douala to manage 
foreign aid and another in Bamenda to manage national aid coming into the region 
(Bang, 2012). International and local NGOs were not included in the committees 
(Bang, 2012; Othman‐Chandev, 1987). At the regional level, the disaster was managed 
by a government committee overseen by the governor of the Northwest Region in 
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Bamenda. Then at the divisional level, a committee was formed and was directed by the 
senior divisional officer (SDO) of Menchum in Wum. This committee was finally 
responsible for the evacuation of survivors from the disaster zone (Bang, 2012; 
Othman‐Chandev, 1987). The official response and evacuation was able to begin a few 
days after the eruption, when it was determined that the area no longer posed any 
immediate risks. The military was also deployed to the disaster zone to assist since they 
had vehicles that could handle the poor road conditions (Bang, 2012; Krajick, 2003; 
Othman‐Chandev, 1987). Since the Nyos area did not have health facilities, many of 
the survivors were taken to the hospital in Wum, Nkambe, and other villages farther 
along the Ring Road.  
After the evacuation, the government and local people worked to bury all those 
who had died and the survivors were housed in temporary tent camps (Bang, 2009). 
Daily necessities were provided for the survivors by missionaries, international aid 
organizations, local citizens, NGOs, and the government of Cameroon. Two years after 
the disaster, resettlement camps were established by the government with assistance 
from non-governmental organizations and individuals to relocate the survivors from the 
affected villages and the surrounding area to safe areas outside of the disaster zone. The 
permanent resettlement camps were built and the survivors were moved into these 
about two years after the disaster had forced them from their homes (Bang, 2009).  
In the decades following the disaster, the government and international aid 
continued sporadically. According to some interviews with community members, aid 
stopped coming a few years after the disaster and is no longer being distributed. This, in 
addition to perceived benefits of living in the villages near the lake, has prompted many 
of the survivors to move back to the disaster zone (Bang, 2009; Bang & Few, 2012). 
Though the disaster zone was reopened for habitation by the government in 2014, most 
of the survivors who have moved back did so long before this announcement and only a 
few interview respondents were aware of the announcement.  
Disaster response tasks for the LND were inhibited by the lack of agency 
capacity as well as the distance of government agencies and their resources from the 
lake. The disaster spurred the government to strengthen its disaster aid and response 
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capabilities. However, the government agencies are still very centralized and this makes 
them less effective in mitigating and responding to hazard events (Aka et al., 2017; 
Bang, 2012, 2013, 2014; Gaston et al., 2012).  
In Cameroon, the responsibilities of disaster and risk management are shared by 
several agencies that work in conjunction with international organizations, NGOs, and 
scientists (Tchindjang, 2018). The hierarchy of these agencies and organizations, as 
described by Tchindjang (2018), is depicted in Figure 5. The Directorate of Civil 
Protection (DPC) manages response efforts and coordinates between the necessary 
administrations. However, the Department of Civil Protection of the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralization (DPC/MINATD) is the organization 
that actually works with and coordinates disaster management with the various other 
agencies. The offices and agencies that collaborate on disaster management and 
response are the Institute of Geological and Mining Research (IRGM), the National 
Institute of Cartography (INC), the Ministry of Public Health (MINSANTE), and the 
National Fire Brigade Corps, not to mention various UN, WHO, and Red Cross 
representatives (MINATD/DCP, 2009; Tchindjang, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchy of disaster management in Cameroon. 
16 
2.2.3 Mitigation 
After the disaster, it was determined that the lake still posed a threat to people 
living in the areas surrounding the lake, which led to the suggestion that the lake be 
degassed in order to mitigate the hazard (Tuttle et al., 1987). Studies showed that the 
level of CO₂ in Lake Nyos was quickly increasing. It was estimated that within 15 - 30 
years the lake would be recharged with more CO₂ than was present before the LND 
(Evans et al., 1994; Kantha & Freeth, 1996; Kling et al., 1994; McCord & Schladow, 
1998; Nojiri et al., 1993). Although suggested at the time of the disaster, degassing did 
not start for another 15 years (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994; Kling et al., 1994; 
Kusakabe et al., 2008).  
In 2001, with the CO₂ at its highest recorded level, degassing began at Lake 
Nyos (Kusakabe, 2017). The project started with one degassing pipe though it quickly 
became clear that more pipes would be needed to mitigate the hazard (Halbwachs & 
Sabroux, 2001; Halbwachs et al., 2004; Kling et al., 2005; Schmid et al., 2006). Two 
more pipes were installed in 2011 which reduced the total gas content to 40% of the 
level it was in 2001, though there was still a significant amount of gas in the lake 
(Evans et al., 2012). 
Since the disaster, the technical management of the CO₂ hazard and the 
degassing has been conducted by international organizations and scientists in 
collaboration with Cameroonian agencies and scientists (Bang, 2012; Kusakabe, 2017; 
Tchindjang, 2018). Technical expertise of the hazard is provided by Cameroonian 
scientists and research institutions based in Yaoundé and they remotely monitor the 
lake from there. 
The government disaster managers focused on the technical aspects of the 
disaster during its management and mitigation, though local groups and organizations 
near the disaster area noticed that the survivors had suffered great socio-economic 
losses that were not being addressed. They were now living in poorer conditions, their 
family ties and social networks had been broken by the disaster, and that the small 
parcels of land allotted to each family living in the camps had created tensions over 
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farming space (Bang, 2012). These socio-economic factors of vulnerability have yet to 
be fully addressed. 
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3. Methods 
Disaster risk (DR) is the interaction of a hazard with a vulnerable population; 
therefore both the specific hazard and vulnerability were characterized for this study. It 
is necessary to examine these two sets of opposing factors of DR in order to understand 
how it is constructed and what DRR measures might be most effective. Individual 
interviews and participant observation were used to gather data for the vulnerability 
analysis while satellite images were used for the hazard analysis. Literature review and 
primary document review were used to gather data for both analyses. The Pressure and 
Release model and Access model were used to analyze the vulnerability of the LND 
survivors. The gas hazard was analyzed using an adapted LAHARZ model in 
MATLAB R2018a and ArcMap 10.5.1. The results of the vulnerability and hazard 
analyses were used to rank the various factors of survivor vulnerability and the gas 
hazard and used with a risk matrix to determine DR. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
The researcher lived and worked in Cameroon for just over two years as a Peace 
Corps Volunteer (PCV). For more than a year and a half of that time the researcher was 
located in Bamenda in the Northwest Region. During that time the researcher made 
frequent trips to villages in and around the Nyos area. On these trips the researcher 
collaborated on various projects with other PCVs and local schools, NGOs, farmers, 
and farming groups.  
Interviews for this study were conducted over eight weeks, from October to 
November 2015, in the Mezam, Menchum, and Boyo Divisions of the Northwest 
Region of Cameroon. These divisions contain the villages, resettlement camps, and 
offices of government and non-governmental organizations where interview 
respondents were living and working. The research project [#799717-1] was approved 
through expedited review by the Michigan Technological University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). There were 88 semi-structured interviews conducted to 
investigate the circumstances, actions, and perceptions of the survivors of the 1986 
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Lake Nyos Disaster (LND). In addition to interviews, field and participant observation 
and review of literature and primary documents were used to gather data for the study. 
Interviews were done individually with survivors of the LND living in the three villages 
most affected by the disaster, the seven resettlement camps, as well as with government 
and NGO representatives who were or have been involved in the management of the 
LND.  
The interview guide was made up of ten open-ended questions (see Appendix 
A). Respondents discussed their personal and survivor perceptions of the formal and 
informal responses, management, and mitigation of the LND as well as their personal 
and survivor actions and circumstances before, during, and since the disaster. The guide 
was adjusted for the individual interviews with government and NGO representatives 
so that they could assist in verifying the timeline of events and clarifying the level and 
nature of their personal and organizational involvement in the disaster response and 
management. To ensure the protection of each respondent’s confidentiality, all of their 
identities were coded and no personally identifiable information was collected. RCA 
Digital Voice recorders were used to record the interviews for translation and 
transcription later on. 
The interviews were conducted in English, West African Pidjin English, 
Fulfulde, and Hausa. This way the respondents could hear and respond to the questions 
in a language with which they were comfortable. Two local translators, who are fluent 
in these languages, were trained by the researcher and assisted with conducting and 
translating the interviews. The researcher was present at every interview to observe and 
take notes as well as certify that the IRB approved project protocol was properly 
conducted. The translators were employed to ensure accurate translation and 
interpretation of the interviews as well as to assist with proper conduct of local 
protocols, which often varied between communities and ethno-linguistic groups within 
the study area. 
The interviews utilized open-ended questions and “snowball” sampling 
techniques to obtain a wider variety of viewpoints and larger number of qualified 
respondents. The interviews used open-ended questions to allow respondents to talk 
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about what they know and not be influenced by the researcher’s opinions (Morgan et 
al., 1992). This method allows respondents to discuss a topic as much or as little as they 
wish and to feel free to share any information that they feel is relevant or important 
even beyond the exact topic of the question. It also allows the conversation to carry on 
longer when a respondent has more information or knowledge about a certain topic. 
The sampling method, “snowball” sampling, is done by asking key individuals and 
respondents to suggest people who may be good candidates for the research until no 
new candidates are suggested (Bernard, 2006). To incorporate a wider variety of 
viewpoints, men and women of each ethno-linguistic group present in each location 
were interviewed. 
Later the transcribed interviews, literature, primary documents, and field notes 
were compiled, organized, and coded by hand to identify themes, connections, and to 
categorize relevant and recurring information in order to assist with analysis. The 
information from field notes, literature and primary document review, participant 
observation, and the interviews was compared and cross-referenced. This ensured the 
quality and accuracy of the data and information that was collected. 
 
3.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
This study used the Pressure and Release (PAR) model and Access model 
(Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2012) to assess the vulnerability of survivors in 
communities in the Lake Nyos area. In the PAR model, the progression of vulnerability 
and hazards converge to define the disaster risk of a community. This model considers 
a wide range of factors affecting vulnerability and goes beyond physical exposure and 
losses. This model is complimented by the Access model, which examines the 
circumstances, actions, and responses of a population affected by a disaster event. The 
Access model comes in where the progression of vulnerability and hazards meet to 
describe and elaborate on how ‘normal life’ is affected and how it changes throughout 
the disaster process. The use of these two models allows for the consideration of 
different factors that affect vulnerability in the study area and which factors play the 
largest role in that vulnerability. Data for the models came from the interviews, field 
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notes from participant observation, literature review, and primary documents. An open 
coding process that utilized inductive and deductive thematic analysis was used to 
identify themes and common threads and ideas in these data sets (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; 
Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). First inductive coding was used to elicit data-driven 
themes. Then, to ensure that all relevant points had been described, the data sets were 
coded again deductively using themes from the original PAR model, Access model, 
interviews, field notes, and literature. 
 
3.2.1 PAR Model 
The PAR model (Figure 6) has two converging sets of factors: the progression 
of vulnerability and the hazard. The progression of vulnerability has different levels of 
causal factors. At the overarching level are the root causes, resulting in dynamic 
pressures at an intermediate level, and fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations at the 
local level. 
The analysis began at the point of convergence; the unsafe conditions were 
described and enumerated using the various coded data sets. The fragile livelihoods and 
unsafe locations were examined first because they are the links between socially 
produced vulnerability and hazards. The local level factors are also the most apparent 
since they directly affect daily life and decision-making. Continuing outward, in the 
opposite direction of the progression of vulnerability, the dynamic pressures were 
assessed in the same manner as the unsafe conditions. The dynamic pressures help 
explain and underscore the impact of root causes on current unsafe conditions. The root 
causes were examined last since a large part of the information needed for these factors 
came from literature review. It was also helpful to understand the way these factors 
have established a foundation and produced the dynamic pressures, macro-forces, and 
unsafe conditions in the area. 
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Figure 6: PAR model from Wisner et al. (2012). 
 
The PAR model was used for identifying and classifying the different factors 
affecting survivor vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area. By considering these factors this 
way, a “chain of explanation” can be seen and examined. The model helps discover 
how the vulnerabilities affecting risk are manifesting. This information can help 
determine possible courses of action for DRR as well as ensure that mitigation and 
DRR strategies that are attempted address the underlying causes of local vulnerability. 
 
3.2.2 Access Model 
The Access model (Figure 7) was used to organize and examine the anecdotal 
evidence from interview data. This model was used to investigate how the respondents’ 
lives and livelihoods were affected by the LND and at what point in the disaster process 
these aspects were affected. The Access model shows how different vulnerability 
factors and resource access from the PAR model are affected during a disaster event. 
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By examining these changes, the factors that are the more fragile factors can be 
identified. Data from interviews, participant observation, and literature review were 
used to examine how the disaster affected various aspects of survivors’ lives at the 
triggering of the disaster and during the disaster in process.  
The Access model is iterative which allows each iteration of the disaster process 
and its effects on resource access and livelihoods to be studied. There are four general 
stages depicted in the model and described by Wisner et al. (2004). The first stage is 
‘normal Life’ (Boxes 1 & 2); the combination of unsafe conditions and livelihoods, 
level of access to resources, how resources are used, and decision-making on potential 
investments. Social relations and structures of domination act on and construct ‘normal 
life’ and unsafe conditions. The trigger event (Box 5) occurs when the time and space 
factors of the gas hazard (Boxes 3 & 4) and ‘normal life’ come together in the second 
stage. This stage is the transition to disaster (Box 6) where the first impacts, after being 
counteracted by any available social protections, start to affect the various aspects of 
‘normal life’. The third stage is the disaster in process (Box 7), which considers the 
reactions and coping strategies that are used to adapt to new conditions. The new 
conditions, coping strategies, and social protections then interact with interventions and 
actions taken for disaster reduction (if any) in stage four (Box 8). Stage four starts a 
new cycle with ‘normal life’ now including the changed or addressed factors. It 
describes the new combination of unsafe conditions and livelihoods, level of access to 
resources, investment opportunity decisions, and how resources are used. The outcome 
can be a safer, more secure ‘normal life’, one that is essentially equivalent to life before 
the disaster, or a less safe and secure life. In other words, the vulnerability of a 
population may decrease, stay the same, or increase through each iteration a disaster 
event. The features of the new ‘normal life’ depend on which actions are taken or not 
taken to improve safety and secure livelihoods after a disaster. 
Since the Access model is iterative, it was used to observe the changes in access 
to resources and livelihoods of survivors during and after the LND. It was also used to 
observe the potential effects of the modeled gas eruption scenarios on current, survivor 
vulnerability in the Nyos area.  
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Figure 7: The Access model from Wisner et al. (2004). 
 
The Access model examines how the survivors’ livelihoods, access to resources, 
and decision-making changed throughout the disaster process. The interviews 
conducted with the government and NGO workers assisted in relating and connecting 
all of the information gathered from the interview data. This model provides the 
connecting point between the hazard and the progression of vulnerability. 
 
3.3 Hazard Assessment 
This study utilized an adapted LAHARZ model in MATLAB R2018a and 
ArcMap 10.5.1 to categorize the gas hazard posed by Lake Nyos. Both the potential 
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flow extent and affected populations were determined for a set of 15 gas release 
scenarios. The adapted LAHARZ model, which was adapted from the LAHARZ model 
from Iverson et al. (1998); Schilling (1998), was used to find inundation patterns 
similar to the LND and for a variety of gas release scenarios. Using a linear regression 
model, derived from the LND inundation pattern, the extent of each scenario’s flow 
was calculated. By mapping the gas flow patterns in ArcMap, potential affected 
populations were found for each scenario. 
 
3.3.1 Mapping 
All of the houses within the AOI were mapped using Google Earth Pro and 
ArcMap 10.5.1. While running the model and mapping the scenarios, it was found that 
several of the scenarios extended past the AOI boundary. The houses that were 
considered affected by the gas flows in these scenarios were mapped so that the 
affected populations could be calculated. The images used for mapping were all from 
2015 or later, most are from 2017 and 2018. Each house which was partially or 
completely overlapped by a modeled gas flow scenario was considered to be affected. 
The total population affected by a scenario was found by multiplying the number of 
houses affected by the average household size (hhs). The national average household 
size in Cameroon is five people and in rural areas is it eight people per household 
(Balgah et al., 2016; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016). A base model was created to simulate 
what a disaster equivalent to the LND would be like today.  
 
3.3.2 Modeling 
There were 15 scenarios modeled for this study. To do this, a base model was 
created using maps and point data (showing percent lethality in surveyed households) 
of the LND from the literature (Figure 8) (Sigurdsson, 1988; Sigurdsson et al., 1987; 
Stupfel & Le Guern, 1989). Since the maps did not completely agree on what areas the 
gas flow covered, the lethality point data was used to adjust the maps so that they 
agreed with the point data. Then the maps were combined to make a single map of the 
LND on which to test the model. The model was run using a variety of cross-sectional 
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areas. Starting at the lake edge, the cross-sectional area that best fit the extent of the 
LND flow was taken at 500m intervals. This was done for the east and west arm of the 
flow. These measurements were then plotted in a scatter plot by distance from the lake 
and each set of cross-sectional areas was fit with a line of best fit. The average slope of 
the two lines (-1.47) was used to create a linear regression model to determine the distal 
extent of each modeled scenario. 
 
 
Figure 8: Outline of the LND gas path with points showing locations where people 
were affected (Sigurdsson, 1988; Stupfel & Le Guern, 1989). 
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The adapted LAHARZ model delineates inundation zones based on a given 
cross-sectional area and starting point. From the starting point, a pixel in the 
accumulation raster, the model maps the given cross-sectional area within the channel 
for each pixel in its path. The code follows the path of steepest descent using a DEM 
and an accumulation raster and continues from the chosen starting point to the edge of 
the raster or given stopping point. The stopping point for each scenario was determined 
by the linear regression model from the base model of the LND scenario. The starting 
point for each branch of the flow was the pixel in the accumulation raster that was 
closest to the lake’s edge in that drainage channel. This was done for each valley except 
the valley just east of the lake, where Buabua is located. This area was affected by the 
LND but is not along one of the primary drainage paths near the lake edge. In order to 
map this area a pixel farther south along the valley on the accumulation raster was 
chosen for each scenario large enough to affect that area. The distance into the valley 
was based on the relative size of the gas flow. Though LAHARZ was designed to map 
gravity flows, it was used here because the villages that were affected by the LND are 
topographically lower than Lake Nyos and CO₂ is heavier than air and fills topographic 
lows. The adapted LAHARZ model shows which areas would be affected by flows 
with different cross-sectional areas.  
The 15 scenarios modeled for this study have cross-sectional areas ranging from 
5,000m² to 100,000m². The cross-sectional areas are in increments of 5,000m² for 
scenarios 1 - 10 and 10,000m² for scenarios 10 - 15. Scenarios 1 - 10 have more 
resolution because they are more possible than larger scenarios. Since degassing started 
at the lake, the amount of gas has been reduced from the amount measured just after the 
LND. The first eight scenarios have smaller cross-sectional areas than the model of the 
LND done for this study. These scenarios are relatively more likely to happen than the 
larger scenarios because of the reduced gas content. Scenarios 11 - 15 have a lower 
possibility of happening so they are given less resolution and weight in calculating the 
disaster risk.  
ArcMap was used to determine the population and areas affected by each 
scenario; the people and areas that could be affected by a disaster similar to the LND 
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and by the 15 other scenarios. Each modeled scenario mapped in ArcMap delineated 
the affected area in each case. The buffering tool in ArcMap was used to determine 
how close the modeled flows come to each village. If part of the village intersects with 
the flow’s buffer, it is considered to be affected and it is considered to be more greatly 
affected if it is intersected by the flow itself. Using the intersect tool in ArcMap, the 
houses that were partially or completely overlapped by each flow were found. The 
number of houses affected by each flow was multiplied by an average household sizes 
(hhs), five is the national average hhs and eight is the average rural hhs (Balgah et al., 
2016; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016).  
This method for analyzing this hazard is useful because it does not require many 
inputs and seems to replicate the extent of the LND gas path fairly accurately (Figure 
9). This is difficult to verify since there is only one case with which to compare it and 
there are not many similar disasters on which to test the method. However, this model 
is simple and it covers the areas that were affected by the LND more accurately than 
other, more complex models (Burton et al., 2017; Costa & Chiodini, 2015). One 
downfall of the model is that it cannot model the flow of gas right near the lake. The 
way the gas must have moved around the lake during the disaster is more complex than 
what this model can map. It can also only model one direction and course of a flow at a 
time. Several starting points were required to map the LND and each gas release 
scenario. 
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Figure 9: Model of the 1986 LND using the adapted LAHARZ model. 
 
3.4 Disaster Risk Assessment 
 To determine DR, from LND survivor vulnerability and the gas hazard, the 
resulting factors from each assessment are ranked. There are several studies which 
work toward quantifying qualitative vulnerability data and there are many studies, 
throughout a variety of disciplines, which attempt to quantify vulnerability (Birkmann, 
2006; Cutter et al., 2008; Ferrier & Haque, 2003; Luers et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 
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2009). Though the PAR model is usually described as a qualitative model some of the 
factors of vulnerability can be measured quantitatively (Birkmann et al., 2013). Roberts 
et al. (2009) describe how qualitative and quantification description of vulnerability 
factors are not always studied exclusively. Often considering vulnerability in both of 
these ways can facilitate the understanding of vulnerability and its multifaceted nature 
(Ferrier & Haque, 2003; Füssel, 2007). In this study the resulting factors of 
vulnerability and how they have changed since the LND, from the PAR and Access 
models, are considered both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 Bollin et al. (2006) expresses the importance of being able to compare the 
variety of factors contributing to DR in order to facilitate tracking changes over time. In 
their study they assign each factor a number from one to three and then created a 
composite score for the hazard and vulnerability. They did this because of the multitude 
of factors they considered for each assessment. Since there are many factors that 
determine vulnerability in the Nyos area, a composite ranking was used for each 
village. Each composite ranking was based on the average (mean) of all of the 
vulnerability factor rankings in a village. This study used the same type of methodology 
as Bollin et al. (2006) and Nirupama (2012), who used a  similar method and quantified 
factors from Wisner et al. (2004)’s PAR and Access models. One of the goals of this 
study is to ascertain which vulnerability and hazard factors contribute most to DR and 
to inform DRR efforts and policies. In order to do this the various measurements of 
each factor (i.e. scenario’s intersection with a village, condition of roads/infrastructure, 
and awareness of degassing project) are ranked so that they can be compared. This was 
done by assigning a value from 1 - 5, based on data from the interviews, participant 
observation, and the literature, according to a set of criteria for each factor (described in 
results). 
For the gas hazard, the potentially affected population for each scenario is based on 
the total number of houses affected. This allows the gas hazard to be ranked based on 
distance from the village or extent of the village covered by the modeled gas flow. 
Where, as a gas flow gets closer to a village the hazard ranking increases. Probability, 
or likelihood, is an essential component to assessing risk. However, calculating or 
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determining, with certainty, the probability of this hazard becoming a disaster is not 
feasible due to the multitude of unknown or unsure elements involved. There has only 
been one recorded gas release at Lake Nyos, the rate of the influx of gas into the lake is 
not constant, and the specific trigger mechanism is unknown. The lack of confidence in 
the exact nature of necessary elements used to calculate time of return or frequency 
makes determining a precise probability impractical. So, in this study the hazard is 
ranked without a probability. However, since probability is such a crucial component of 
hazard assessments, an additional hazard ranking, a composite score including 
likelihood, is determined using subjective probability. 
Subjective probability is used to estimate the likelihood of an event using intuition 
and experience. In this case, the likelihood of each modeled scenario was determined 
based on information from the literature and the researcher’s personal opinion. 
Subjective probability is often used for risk assessments, especially when there are 
unknown factors or there is not enough data to determine frequency (Aven & Zio, 
2011; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Cooke, 1991; Tversky, 1967). It is also used in natural 
hazard and disaster risk assessments (Aven & Renn, 2009a, 2009b; Marzocchi et al., 
2004; Marzocchi & Woo, 2007; Neri et al., 2008; Woo, 1999). Many risk and hazard 
assessment studies focus on volcanoes because of their complexity and unpredictable 
nature (Aspinall et al., 2003; Donovan et al., 2012; Martí et al., 2008; Marzocchi et al., 
2004; Sobradelo et al., 2014; Sobradelo & Martí, 2010; Woo, 2008). The LND is 
similar in its unpredictability. This is mainly due to the lack of specific knowledge on 
the nature and mechanisms of the hazard. Owing to the lack of information that usually 
informs disaster event probability; this study uses evidence that is known about the gas 
hazard to advise the interpretation of the likelihood attributed to each modeled scenario. 
It should be noted that the likelihoods used for this study are the researcher’s personal 
opinion and intuition. It is known that there is less gas in the lake now then there was 
just after the disaster in 1986 and that the lower gas content is due to the active artificial 
degassing that is ongoing at the lake (Kusakabe, 2017). However, it is also known that 
the recharge rate of the gas is variable (Evans et al., 1993; Evans et al., 1994). These 
elements were used to inform the researcher’s opinion when attributing likelihood to 
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each modeled scenario. The concept that smaller disasters happen with more frequency 
than larger disasters was also considered because of the nature of the hazard and the 
way gas accumulates in the lake (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Kaplan & Garrick, 
1981; Kunreuther, 1996; Merz et al., 2009). 
 The likelihood factors used are between zero and one so that when they are 
combined with the hazard rankings to make a composite score they are still comparable 
to the vulnerability rankings. This was also done so that the composite score could also 
be used in the risk matrix used to exam the DR. Risk matrices are often used to 
examine the likelihood and consequences of a disaster event. In this study vulnerability 
is also considered in the matrix, which is sometimes done when risk matrices are used 
specifically with natural hazards (Aven, 2007; Garvey & Lansdowne, 1998; Glade, 
2003). 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Vulnerability Analysis 
The Pressure and Release model was used to explore current unsafe conditions 
in the Lake Nyos area while the Access model was used to examine the changes in 
access to resources throughout the process of the 1986 LND. In this way differences in 
how current access could be affected in the event of another gas release can be 
investigated.  Understanding the factors that create disaster risk and how those factors 
may be affected by specific disaster events is essential to effective DRR, risk 
management, mitigation efforts, and disaster-related initiatives. Disaster risk is created 
by the interaction of one or more natural hazards and vulnerability, making it important 
to consider the variables from both sides (Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2012). 
Disaster risk in the Nyos area comes from vulnerabilities specific to the area and 
created by root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions which developed on 
the local and national levels. Vulnerabilities vary among populations due to a variety of 
factors, including socio-economic status, age, gender, and access to resources. These 
factors are dynamic and change as conditions and access change (Birkmann & Wisner, 
2006; Wisner et al., 2004). 
 
4.1.1 The Disaster Process of the LND 
On the evening of the Lake Nyos Disaster, people in the villages were going 
about their regular evening tasks. They were cooking, eating dinner, children were 
playing, and many families had already retired for the evening when Lake Nyos 
erupted. Many survivors described how they had no idea what was going on and 
quickly became disoriented.  This  was due to the lack of oxygen, which was displaced 
by the carbon dioxide (Baxter & Kapila, 1989; Baxter et al., 1989). One survivor 
described how she became confused and did not know what was happening: 
 
“On that day, we were out in the fields. And immediately after we 
came back from the farm, we had our bath, ate, and slept. It all began 
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with my baby. The baby began to stress and stretch her body. I thought, 
“What is happening?” The lamp was on, then immediately, it died down 
by itself. I got up and called my child and asked, “Where are the 
matches? I want to light the lamp again.” I took the match and I lit it but 
to no avail. Then the other children, who were sleeping, started falling 
in different directions. Even the baby I was holding in my arms, fell 
down and I didn’t even realize. We struggled and struggled until we 
moved out of the house, not even dressed, moving around. We did not 
even know what we were doing. I also didn’t know where I was going. 
My senses only came back a long time after that. When my sense came 
back, I realized I had been watching the children. I went back to the 
house. I found the children; they were lying where they had fallen. The 
ones under the bed had excreted. Then I joined all the children in the 
same place. At that point we smelled something like gunpowder. The 
children were breathing heavily, gasping for air. Then my husband’s 
brother came down and was crying, saying that he didn’t know what he 
would tell his brother about what had happened to his family. [His 
family was similarly affected.] We sat there until it was morning. And 
then we heard that it did not only occur in our compound but it was 
everywhere in the village.” 
 
Many people found it difficult to move and were often unable to help 
themselves. Those who could, went to give help and get help from their families, 
friends, and neighbors. A respondent describes how difficult it was to walk or even 
move: 
 
“So, actually what happened that night to me was that we were 
sleeping. Everybody was asleep. I was not sleeping, I just lay in bed. 
And all of the sudden it sounded as if there was a storm outside. At first I 
thought, “Oh, we need water. I should go and get the pots so they’ll be 
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outside.” Then I thought, “No, they are already outside.” And then I 
worried, “Oh, I hope the lids don’t get blown away. I should go protect 
them, put stones on them.” And then it occurred to me, “Oh, no, it will 
be okay, they are safe outside”. So, that was the last thing I could 
remember, thinking about the pots and the buckets outside. And when 
the people finally came to our compound, I did not know exactly what 
was happening. So, as I was gaining consciousness, I heard a woman 
talking to me. And I felt as though the ground beneath me was shaking 
and I was falling again and again on the floor. And the woman was still 
talking to me. And when my eyes opened, I realized that I was bundled in 
a blanket from inside but I was outside. And Alhagi [a title given to a 
Muslim person who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca], who lives 
below us was there. So, Alhagi who lives below us was one of the people 
who helped drag me outside. I was wrapped in a blanket. And I could 
still feel the ground under me turning and turning. And I started 
vomiting. But all that I was thinking was that I was sick, that I was 
recovering from a fit. So, in the morning I was unable to recognize 
anybody. I opened my eyes, I could see but I was unable to recognize the 
children. And I realized that all the fowls in the compound were dead. 
Alhagi was making desperate attempts to reach out to people to come 
and find out what is happening. That night he rushed out, fell down, 
couldn’t breathe. When he recovered and regained consciousness he 
rushed back to the compound and tried to go out again. He was trying to 
run out that night to call people to come and see what is happening but 
he was unable. He was just lucky, he would have died too. So, that 
morning I was unable to stand up and I had a baby, a small child by 
then. Another woman had to carry that baby. We were struggling to go 
up to Alhagi’s compound up the hill from our compound. And so I was 
down, kneeling down, creeping on the ground as we were going up. I 
was unable to move.” 
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As people started to recover, they went around checking on their families, friends, 
and neighbors. Many respondents explained how they found very few people alive, so 
many had died. A respondent recounts the scene that many of them found: 
 
“Nearly all of those who survived, they went round to various 
compounds to see the type of damage and people dead. They went down 
to the village of Nyos to see how everyone was, they were dead. I was 
just lying down I was unable to move, I was just weak, I couldn’t even 
stand up. So, after two days I felt a little better and I was able to move. 
So, I went down to the village of Nyos and I saw corpses thrown here 
and there but I didn’t go to any Aku [an ethnic subgroup in the 
Northwest Region known for being cattle grazers] man’s compound to 
see the situation. I only had the opportunity to go to Nyos village and 
arriving there I saw corpses thrown left and right beside the road, trees, 
plantains and banana stems uprooted from the ground, their roots lying 
outside. So, everywhere there were corpses. So, things were just 
scattered anyhow, every living thing was motionless, was dead. Every 
living thing was dead.” 
 
One of the first NGO responders who arrived at Lake Nyos after the disaster 
also describes what they saw: 
 
“Yes, on Sunday morning, I heard that something had happened 
somewhere between Kumfutu and Misaje. In that area, the valley there. 
So, I happened to meet the SDO, who had also heard reports and was 
preparing to go and investigate. So, I asked him whether I could join the 
party and go with them. So, he accepted and I joined them. And when we 
reached the level of Kumfutu, which is still high up, the whole convoy 
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stopped. So, I then inquired and said that, “What happened? Why are 
we stopping here?” And they said, well they don’t want to go any 
further. So, I asked for permission to proceed because I saw some 
people coming out of the valley. So, I reasoned with them, that if people 
can come out of the valley, I could go in too. And then I went ahead and 
then I reached first, Cha. Then I went to Nyos. And from there I 
continued to Subum. And, so, in Cha, I met people who survived, who 
had woken up and regained consciousness. And I also saw many people 
who were dead there. Then in Nyos, I met also people who were sitting 
there but they were not the people who had been in the village on the 
night of the disaster. These were people who had come down from the 
hills, so they were mostly Aku people, who had cows on top of the hills, 
and who were now, you know, sitting there just… just not knowing what 
to do. And of course, everywhere again, I saw dead people, dead cattle, 
just no sign of life, not even a mosquito or a fly or anything. Nothing. So, 
it then happened that a helicopter pilot flew over. He had also, 
apparently, heard that something had happened and he flew over the 
lake. He noticed me and came down and I asked him then, could he 
bring me back to the point where I had left the SDO and the other 
people? So, he accepted and we went back and we couldn’t see anybody 
anymore at that point where I’d, where I’d left them. And so, we went 
back as far as Weh, and no one was there. So, he brought me back to 
Nyos and then took off and went his own way. And I continued to Subum, 
where I again met people who had survived the gas eruption and 
others… many of them were, dead. When I went back and I took people 
with me who wanted to be evacuated, who had burns and other kinds of 
injuries, I deposited them at the Wum Hospital. And then I went to see 
the SDO, at his residence, at Wum Lake, and I gave my report. Then we 
went together to the post office, because at that time there was no 
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telephone connection or what there. There was no connection. You could 
only call through the post office.” 
 
Many survivors lost their social networks, their support systems. Family and 
friends are the first place community members go to for physical help, financial 
assistance, or shelter in times of hardship. Many of them also lost a significant portion 
of their assets and in some cases, their entire livelihood. The LND killed many cattle 
and other domesticated animals. For some survivors their livestock had been their main 
source of income. A respondent describes how his life has changed from losing his 
main livelihood: 
 
“I prefer the way life was before the disaster because, by then, I had 
my milk and I would drink it. And I had my cattle… I was fine then and I 
did not have so many worries. But now I’m not living fine. I’m in ‘level 
one’ now. I have nothing. By then I was in ‘level two’. But I’m in level 
one now.” 
 
Many survivors talked about how they felt as though they had not been able to 
return to the same standard of living that they had in 1986. They often expressed their 
hopes for their children. One survivor talks about his current situation and his hope that 
his children might have a better life some day: 
 
“No, I have not really gotten my life back. Maybe my children will 
one day have something like that. But for now, there is nothing… Even 
the house that I had before that disaster, I don’t have it now.” 
 
4.1.2 The Progression of Vulnerability in the Lake Nyos Area 
In order to understand disaster risk in the Nyos area, it is necessary to 
understand the unsafe conditions present there and which are created by historic socio-
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economic structures and ideologies. The root causes, dynamic pressures, and fragile 
livelihoods and unsafe locations of the progression of vulnerability in the Lake Nyos 
area are presented in the PAR model for the Nyos area (Figure 10). The Access model 
augments the PAR model and reinforces the determination of the fragility of 
vulnerability factors. 
 
 
Figure 10: The progression of vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area, Cameroon, adapted 
from Wisner et al. (2012). 
 
Root causes 
The vulnerability of survivors in the Nyos area is deeply embedded in the 
country’s history and power structures. The anglophone regions of Cameroon have a 
history of federal and national-level socio-economic and political marginalization 
which has led to the underrepresentation and powerlessness of anglophone 
Cameroonians (Achankeng, 2015; Akum, 2009; Vubo & Ngwa, 2001). Since 
reunification, anglophone Cameroonians have felt that they were being subjugated by 
the francophone federal government. In turn, this has led to a sense of cultural 
nationalism among anglophone Cameroonians. The federal government, under the 
guise of attempting to drive uniformity for national unity, often tries to impose the 
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French systems of law, education, and other institutions on the anglophone regions 
(Akum, 2009; Vubo & Ngwa, 2001). Since Cameroon is a bilingual country, all of the 
francophone students are taught English and all of the anglophone students are taught 
French. There is a clear difference in the level of enforcement this system receives 
between the anglophone and francophone regions. Anglophone civil servants and 
government agents posted in francophone regions speak French whereas francophone 
civil servants in anglophone regions often speak little to no English (Akum, 2009; 
Ayafor, 2005). Ideologies shaped by the region’s history and culture also affect 
vulnerability in this area. Although the gas hazard represents one of the most 
potentially disastrous natural hazards in the area, many community members do not 
consider the gas hazard an important safety threat. When asked about their perception 
of the gas hazard, many respondents expressed either that the gas hazard no longer 
presents a danger or that it does not matter whether or not it is dangerous. Many 
respondents believe that they will certainly die if an eruption occurs because it would 
be fate:  
 
“Well, there is nothing. I’ve just come back with only one aim in 
my mind, if it is to happen, let it happen and if I am to die in that 
particular incident, I will aim to die. That will be my fate.” 
 
This fatalistic worldview is shared by many in the local communities and even 
talking about the disaster is seen as asking it to happen. One respondent, living outside 
of the disaster area, discusses this viewpoint: 
 
“The only thing I can tell you is that, your conscience should be 
clear because it is an emergency, something that nobody expected is 
going to come. So, feel free and I beg you we should only be thanking 
God. Whatever comes, whether it is good or bad, we just have to accept 
it. We cannot say, this things has come as if you were expecting it to 
come. It is a surprise, just like death too. Because all of us are visitors 
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here, we will go back as we came. And you cannot refuse to go back 
because you did not even know how you came. So, I can only say, it is 
God who gives and he is the one who takes away. So, sorry. All of us are 
a part of who will go, nobody will remain here. That’s all the advice I 
can give you if you were to have any problem too.” 
 
Survivors believe that there is nothing that they can do to change how they 
might be affected. In conjunction with this, there is also a belief that is summed up by a 
common phrase used by Cameroonians, “On va faire comment?” When the people use 
this phrase they mean, “What can anyone do?” Many stated that even if they are afraid 
of the hazard or think it is dangerous, they have no way, financially or physically, to 
escape from a gas eruption. Many also stated the importance of living in the place 
where you were born, even if it is dangerous. One survivor expresses this feeling: 
 
“It’s just that we don’t have anywhere to go. Like, if we had a place 
to go then we would not be here. That’s why, in case that lake, that thing 
happens again it will only kill us. But we don’t have a place to go 
because this is where we were born.” 
 
These ideologies and beliefs discourage disaster preparedness because death is 
viewed as inevitable if the disaster occurs no matter what is done in preparation. Many 
respondents expressed that preparing for a disaster is pointless: 
 
“Hmm… I don’t think, I don’t think there is anything people can do 
except prayers, except prayers. There is nothing that we can do; it is 
only prayers to God, little prayers to God. Yes.” 
 
There is not much of a culture or idea of disaster and disaster preparation in 
Cameroon. One of the NGO workers discusses this during their interview: 
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“And I have no knowledge of whether they do anything to protect 
themselves against natural disasters. There is always a question, 
whether people here, in Cameroon, believe in natural disasters. When 
something happens, then they try to find an explanation for that. Maybe 
because of their lack of scientific knowledge, or what, but mostly they 
find the causes of a disease or a natural disaster in relationships, in 
relationships with other people who are still alive or in relationships 
with people who have deceased already, who are dead. So, their 
forefathers may be displeased because of certain things, that they have 
not followed certain traditions, or what, or maybe because of jealousy 
from some people against others. These they normally see as the causes 
of disasters.” 
 
Dynamic pressures 
The centralized political structure delays and curtails decision-making on the 
regional, divisional, and local levels. Local and regional politics are also dominated by 
this centralized power structure which leads to a lack of representation for small, rural 
communities like those in the Nyos area. Dynamic pressures in the PAR model are the 
‘chain of explanation’ that convey the influence of historic root causes on current 
unsafe conditions (Wisner et al., 2004). The Access model also considers these factors 
and how access to them could change during a disaster event. Poor access to resources 
has negative impacts on many aspects of village and community life and makes the 
community less able to cope with a potential disaster. 
There is a general lack of local institutions in the Lake Nyos area; though there 
are several more schools and health clinics than there were in 1986. Shortly after the 
disaster, buildings for accommodating researchers and government agents were built at 
the lake (Bang, 2008). However, permanent institutions dealing with risk, disasters, and 
first response are still located far from the area. Local institutions that are present 
usually lack offices or official meeting places and those that do have offices are often 
understaffed and ill equipped (Bang, 2012, 2013, 2014; Gaston et al., 2012). The 
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government agencies that deal with natural disasters include departments specifically 
dedicated to monitoring hazards posed by Lake Nyos and evaluating the conditions in 
which survivors live. However, these agencies maintain little to no presence in the Lake 
Nyos area. The closest offices are in Wum, about 30km from Nyos, and most of the 
monitoring is done remotely from offices in Yaoundé (Bang, 2008, 2012, 2016). 
Although 30km is not a long distance, due to poor road conditions and infrastructure, it 
takes an hour to travel this distance in the dry season, sometimes more in the rainy 
season. When asked if he believes that another disaster like the LND would be worse 
than in 1986, one respondent passionately describes the poor road conditions and 
unfulfilled promises of assistance: 
 
“Yes! For example, the problem is that they said they will dig 
this road, since then right up til now, they have not done it. So you see, 
they have not done anything. They said they will dig this road, they have 
not dug it. The road leading from here to the lake, they said they would 
dig it and put tar on it, they have not done it. So all those fake promises 
are never fulfilled, that is what I am trying to say. And even this road 
that you used to come to this place, if not of the benefit of WADA [Wum 
Area Development Authority, a local NGO], because this area was the 
WADA zone, like there would be no road linking this place to other 
places.” 
 
At the time of the LND, there were no hospitals or health centers in the area. 
Survivors went by foot or were taken to the hospitals in Wum and Nkambe, 30km and 
63km from Nyos, respectively. When asked how long it took survivors to arrive at the 
hospital and mission in Wum, an NGO worker recalls: 
 
“Well, I can say, some two or three days. And then a week went by and 
people were still coming.” 
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Many people remember not knowing what was happening. They discussed how people 
from other villages came to help. Respondents often spoke about waking up in the 
hospital, one remembers: 
 
“We discovered that we were in the hospital. And we did not know 
what we were doing and we did not even know what had happened. 
When news had circulated about the disaster, people had come from 
Fonfuka, Wum, and Nkambe. They rushed to help us. They all came with 
vehicles. They took some people to the hospital in Wum while others 
were taken to the hospital in Nkambe.” 
 
 According to an employee at the hospital in Wum, the hospital has been made a 
district hospital so that it might better assist people if another gas eruption occurs. A 
health center has also been built near Subum. This increases community access to 
health care. However, the clinic is within the area affected by the LND and the 
community would not be able to use the facility in the event of a similar eruption. 
Many people in the Nyos area do not fully understand what happened during the 
disaster and the nature of the hazard (Bang, 2012, 2013, 2016). There is a lack of 
training and scientific knowledge generally and regarding the gas hazard. A few 
schools have been built since the disaster and, according to respondents; it is not an 
easy task getting such investments for their communities. Members of the community 
are usually required to buy materials and build the schools. Once the building is 
complete and the school has teachers and students, the government will come and 
approve it as a government school. Many respondents talked about the lack of schools 
and how they struggle to get them made: 
 
“If you look at our schools, they have been constructed by us. The 
government has approved our G.S. school here, government secondary 
school here.” 
 
45 
This is a difficult feat to accomplish for the communities because of the 
financial burden that it puts on community members. Training and scientific knowledge 
is also lacking due to the corruption of some officials and normal bureaucracy of 
government offices. Permission must be obtained to post information publicly or 
disseminate information through schools or similar means and this permission often 
requires a bribe payment (Bang, 2013; Daniel, 2016; Neneh, 2014). This keeps 
information from being shared easily and freely, which contributes to the community 
members’ lack of knowledge on the hazard.  
After the LND, the population of the Nyos area changed completely due to the 
evacuation. Several thousand survivors fled their homes and went to stay at missions, 
hospitals, and even in fields in other villages (Bang, 2008, 2012, 2016). Most displaced 
survivors lived away from the disaster area for the following two years in temporary 
tent camps. One NGO worker describes the areas where the displaced survivors stayed 
for those two years: 
 
“The whole [Nyos] valley was then out of bounds. And then, of 
course, the question came up, “Where do we put these people?” So, at 
the mission, in Wum, St. Martins, there was a former domestic science 
school, which we didn’t use anymore. So, it was decided that it should 
be offered to put up people. Fields were made available, where you see 
the health center now. That was a field. So we put up the area with tents. 
We had the parish hall, which was made available. They made available 
the field in Kumfutu, where there was an out station. So, a small church 
community there, a school, and a field. Those were made available too. 
So, all that happened in just the week after the disaster.” 
 
In 1988, almost two years after the disaster, the government and local missions, 
with assistance from international aid, built resettlement camps where survivors could 
be permanently relocated. Some of these camps were built next to villages where 
survivors had stayed during the two year period while others were built next to villages 
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closer to the lake. Although many survivors stayed away from the Lake Nyos area, 
some moved back to their homes shortly after the disaster and others followed when 
they faced difficulties in the resettlement camps. A respondent discusses how many 
people have moved back to the villages around Lake Nyos: 
 
“I think the life in Subum was better. That’s why people are 
going back there. Or if the life in this camp was better for them, they 
would have not been going back there. For here we don’t even have our 
farming lands. If you even have the farming lands, the lands are ill fed. 
So, there is nothing good in this place. That is why most of them are 
going back there. We want to get the population of those who are living 
here and those who are going back there. So, that population of those 
going back there are more that those who are staying here. All of those 
who are living here, they are still farming but up there. So, there is 
nothing good here.” 
 
Another respondent describes life in the resettlement camp, how aid was 
unevenly distributed, and why he and others decided to move back to the Lake Nyos 
area: 
 
“[The government would] usually bring us food and other items, 
like blankets and sometimes when they come, to the head of each family, 
they will give him some amount of money like 5,000, which is not even 
enough. They will give him 5,000 francs to run for the whole week. And 
you don’t even know what to do, it is not even enough. Then they will 
stay away for like 12 months and then they will come again, they will 
bring food stuffs like rice, beans… In fact they usually just bring food 
and throw it to us like we are fowls. The way you feed fowls, you throw 
the food on the ground, they come and pick and eat. That is how the 
government usually comes. Then after that they came with some cattle. 
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They gave people cattle too, but we, most of us who are living this way, 
nobody received a single cow. But other survivors, like those who were 
in Upkwa and in Kumfutu and Esu, they all received cattle from the 
government. Even some people in Kimbi and Ipalim also received cattle. 
But those of us who are around this area, did not receive anything like 
that. And the government, by that time, tried to explain to us why it 
happened like that. They said that, “Why did we move out of the place 
that they gave us?” We told them that our cattle are dying where they 
kept us and we cannot sit and watch them die, meanwhile we have other 
places that we can take them to. That is why we decided to move out.” 
 
During the two year period between the disaster and the building of the camps, 
people moving into the area found empty houses with farm land and took up residence 
there. Later, this barred many survivors from returning to their ancestral homes near the 
lake so they had to stay in the camps or move to different villages (Bang, 2009; Bang & 
Few, 2012).This also happened in the resettlement camps. Several interview 
respondents living in camps indicated that houses vacated by their neighbors when they 
returned to the disaster area were taken over by people attempting to take advantage of 
incoming aid. 
When survivors were resettled in camps most families were given a 30m² plot 
of land and a house. The spacing and size of each parcel of land does not provide 
sufficient space for farming and restricts local farmers’ choices in what crops they grow 
(Bang, 2009, 2012; Bang & Few, 2012). Even survivors who live in the villages near 
the lake or have found space elsewhere choose to grow crops that they are sure will 
grow and that their family will use. In some cases, resettlement camps were built on 
land that was already being used by other cattle grazers or farmers. This, in addition to 
poorly defined field and pasture borders, has caused significant discord between 
farmers and grazers (Bang, 2008, 2012). This can be even worse in areas where there 
are semi-nomadic cattle grazers who do not use defined grazing pastures. One 
respondent describes how serious this conflict is in some areas: 
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“As we are here, the cows do not allow us to farm. They are 
everywhere. We cannot even farm next to our own houses because the 
cows come and eat everything. And there is nothing that we can do. If 
we try to tell anyone [in the government or city council], the Mbororos 
[an ethnic group who are nomadic cattle herders] come and kill that 
person. There is one boy here who is about to go to Wum because they 
killed his brother. Cows ate his crops and he wanted to tell someone, so 
they beat him and killed him. We can work a small piece of land in front 
of your door and you still won’t be able to eat.” 
 
There is ongoing ethnic discrimination in the area that is rooted in the region’s 
history but is exacerbated by the lack of arable land. Several interview respondents, like 
the one quoted above, described how this or that ethnic group was part of the reason 
their living situations are not as good as they could be. There was blame being placed 
on farmers’ or cattle grazers’ ethnicities as being the cause of the farmer/grazer conflict 
(Bang, 2009; Pelican, 2006, 2008). Some respondents also described how various 
ethnic groups benefited more or less than another from the resettlement and aid that 
was distributed after the disaster. Sometimes this is tied to the ongoing conflict and 
terrorism happening in neighboring countries. Some respondents, when approached as a 
possible interviewee, expressed suspicion of people from outside the area or other 
strangers. Some talked about their fear that agents from terrorist groups or refugees 
from conflict zones would come to the area since they live so close to the border with 
Nigeria. 
 
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations 
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations are the direct links between a disaster 
and the deeper causes of socially produced vulnerability. They are the most evident 
factors because they apply directly to the resources and functions of daily life and 
livelihoods. Communities in the Lake Nyos area rely mainly on agriculture; subsistence 
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farming and cattle grazing are the two primary occupations. Community members have 
limited land and limited access to land on which to farm and graze their cattle, 
especially in the resettlement camps. One respondent who has moved back to the Nyos 
area stresses the limited space available for farming: 
 
“As we were in Kimbi, it was the government that was feeding us, 
paying for everything. As for me, on my own part, I’m telling you what I 
know, I was just doing farming on a smaaalll piece of land.” 
 
This has compelled many survivors to move back to the disaster zone. Some 
moved back because they were able to farm on their original fields and others moved 
because of more fertile soil and available land (Balgah et al., 2016; Bang, 2012).  
Many survivors of the LND report that their health has not been the same since 
the disaster and because they are older and do not have the strength or endurance that 
they used to. Life expectancy in Cameroon is about 55 years (CIA, 2017) and those 
interviewed were all at least 30 years old, many were much older. Several interview 
respondents expressed that they would not be able to escape a disaster if it depended on 
their strength or moving quickly. They said that they would just have to wait for it to 
come since they wouldn’t be able to run.  
Many people in the area complete grade school and sometimes at least part of 
secondary school. After school most of them become farmers or cattle grazers, learning 
by helping their parents in the fields (Balgah et al., 2012; Bang, 2008). Those who are 
able to go to cities have more opportunities for training in skills other than farming and 
cattle grazing (Balgah et al., 2012). 
People in the Lake Nyos area, especially if they are survivors of the disaster, 
have limited social networks. Family members, relatives, and neighbors usually make 
up a person’s social network but survivors of the LND lost many of these people in the 
disaster, either through death or separation (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2016; Bang & 
Few, 2012). In times of hardship, the first place people in the area go is to this social 
network for assistance (Fleischer, 2007). Respondents described how they ran to 
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relatives and neighbors for help when the disaster happened. Many survivors can no 
longer do this; they have had to create new social networks since the disaster. This has 
not been easy for them to do because they were moved into the resettlement camps 
where the neighbors living in the houses on either side of them could be from a 
different village, religion, ethnic group, or even speak a different native language 
(Pelican, 2006). It was also difficult because of increased social tension over farming 
and grazing land (Bang, 2012).  
Local market access is hindered by poor roads and infrastructure as well as low 
income levels which keep people from traveling. Due to poor road conditions and lack 
of income available for travel and transport, vendors from outside the area rarely come 
through and local farmers with produce to sell are rarely able to travel to markets where 
there could be improved access to buyers. Communities around Lake Nyos, especially 
in the resettlement camps, have limited land for agriculture and economic factors that 
tie people’s livelihoods to the land affect local markets. The lack of physical locations 
and structures are due to the lack of local investments. However, the lack of buying and 
selling is caused by lack of crop diversity and poor transport. One respondent expressed 
discontent with government aid and the state of market roads: 
 
“I think in 2012, they came with some food items, some blankets, 
some mattresses, and gave people here. But, I, for one, don’t consider 
that as, as a good help. Because if the government really wants to help 
they would select some few children from this area and sponsor [them to 
go to school]. There is even no farm to market road, even if the 
government can help us to open up this road [motions to Buabua-
Fundong road], I think it will pass through Fundong to here. You’ve 
seen the nature of the road. So, if the government was to do that or if the 
government did that we’d have been very happy. I would not cry of my 
poverty here again. Everything, everything does well here [crops grows 
well]. But there is no means to transport it to the market.” 
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A majority of community members are farmers and they grow crops that do 
well in the environment and that they will use in their households (Amin & Manga, 
2010; Ngwa & Balgah, 2016). Community members would rather not than spend 
money on produce they already grow or can grow for themselves. Subsistence farmers 
also rarely buy produce because they grow many of the same crops and have even less 
disposable income (Amin & Manga, 2010). The lack of income also causes a lack of 
job diversity and opportunities. People are not able to risk what little they have in order 
to invest in a new venture or opportunity. 
In most places in Cameroon, even in some larger cities, formal credit is almost 
nonexistent; items must be paid in full before they can be taken home. Banks do 
provide loan services but have very stringent guidelines for borrowers (Mayoux, 2001). 
These services are rarely available outside of larger towns and cities and are not usually 
financially accessible to rural farmers (Balgah et al., 2012; Bime & Mbanasor, 2011a, 
2011b). Common forms of credit used locally are njangis and tontines. These are 
groups formed by community members and are a way to save money and also to get 
access to loans in times of financial need. A respondent describes why so many people 
in the community use njangis: 
 
“My reason for playing Njangi is that, as I am like this now, if I 
have two hundred francs in my hand, I will go and play it in the njangi. 
Because it can happen tomorrow that I’m sick. I can go to the njangi 
house and say, “Let them assist me.” They can decide to give me even 
five thousand for me to use and go to the hospital. Or even if it might be 
my child who is sick, I will just rush to the people and say, “Please, my 
sisters, assist me. You know I usually come and play njangi here. Please, 
assist me and give me money.” They will easily decide and give me 
money to take my child to the hospital.” 
 
The exact terms of the group are decided by the members, i.e. the order and 
timing of loans given out, the interest rates on loans, etc. (Bime & Mbanasor, 2011a, 
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2011b). Another respondent explains how each member contributes a small amount of 
money to the total to be handed out as loans: 
 
“Yeah. I sold my planks. I have a hundred francs, I go and play 
there every country Sunday [local day for resting]. Like yesterday was a 
country Sunday. When we receive this money we will send our children 
to school. Like now we have recently shared the njangi, then we are 
starting back again.  Sometimes when you have an accident or an 
emergency you can rush there and then collect some money to solve the 
problem or you go and buy your medicine. So we play in the njangi 
every country Sunday and Sunday is 100 francs.” 
 
Often group meetings are also a social opportunity for the members and food 
and drink are shared. Many of these groups run without issue however there is a great 
deal of distrust between people when it comes to dealing with and handling money 
(Azibo & Buchenrieder, 2011). This makes it difficult for some groups because of the 
interest rates and loan pay back times they impose and the action taken when someone 
cannot or does not pay back their loan on time. This is the main way of gaining access 
to credit in the camps and villages, so many community members belong to a njangi or 
tontine. 
Before the LND there was very little in the way of disaster preparedness and 
though this has increased since the disaster, there are not many emergency service 
workers or offices kept in the Nyos area (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016; Bang & 
Few, 2012; Le Guern et al., 1992; Shanklin, 1988; Tchindjang, 2018). There is also not 
a strong social protection network setup in the area. Most government offices and 
resources dealing with disaster preparedness and social protection are at least an hour or 
more away by car. This, in conjunction with poor road conditions, makes it difficult for 
emergency responders to get in and out of the area and for community members to 
reach or have access to these types of resources. 
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4.1.3 Vulnerability Ranking 
Each factor in each village was considered individually and was determined by 
participant observation data, interviews, and literature. The factors were ranked from 1 
- 5, where generally 1 represents a factor that was not discussed as significantly 
contributing to the survivors’ vulnerability due to excellent access to the resource 
and/or the factor was discussed as something of very low concern or importance to the 
respondents, 2 represents good access to the resource and/or was described as being of 
low concern or importance, 3 represents fair access to the resources and/or of moderate 
concern or importance, 4 represents mediocre access to the resource and/or of high 
concern or importance, and 5 represents poor access to the resource and/or of very high 
concern or importance. All of the vulnerability factors considered are summarized and 
ranked in Table 1. The factors that are root causes are not included because they are too 
deeply ingrained and require significantly more in depth study to be cover thoroughly 
within the scope of this study. 
Cha and Buabua generally ranked higher in all the factors because they do not 
have the same access or same quality or quantity of resources as Nyos and Subum. 
They rank higher in societal deficiencies than Nyos and Subum because Nyos and 
Subum are located on the Ring Road and have easier access to certain resources 
through transportation and services that come along the road. The Ring Road is the 
main access road through the Northwest Region. Cha also sits on this road but has no 
health clinic or market like Subum and no school or several hundred meters of 
improved road like Nyos. This is the same case with the macro forces. Cha and Buabua 
have higher rankings because factors such as ‘farmer/grazer conflict’ and ‘ongoing 
ethnic and linguistic discrimination’ were discussed more often and respondent’s 
expressed their significance in the community. 
Since Nyos and Subum are on the Ring Road they are easier to reach than 
Buabua. This means that they receive more visitors, government and NGO assistance, 
and local government investment. Buabua also typically ranks higher than Nyos and 
Subum because there is little to no infrastructure there. Buabua has a market structure 
but little buying and selling happens there, the roads are very poor, and there is no cell 
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phone reception. In the villages on the Ring Road cell phone reception is sometimes 
available. Cha also ranks higher than Nyos and Subum because it is a smaller village 
and only recently began the process of building its own market. The occasional market 
that is held in Nyos and the weekly market in Subum help those villages attract buyers 
and sellers from nearby who bring some money to these villages. 
 
Table 1: Ranking of vulnerability factors. Factors are ranked from 1 - 5, 1 being 
excellent access and/or of very low concern, 2 being good access and/or of low 
concern, 3 being fair access and/or of moderate concern, 4 being mediocre access 
and/or of high concern and 5 being poor access and/or of very high concern. 
Dynamic pressures Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Societal 
deficiencies, 
lack of 
Local institutions 4 5 3 4 
Training/scientific 
knowledge 
3 5 5 4 
Local investments 3 3 3 5 
Local markets 3 4 2 5 
Infrastructure and 
maintenance 
4 5 4 5 
Macro-forces 
Rapid population 
displacement/change 
5 5 5 4 
Change in local 
demographics 
3 3 4 5 
Ongoing ethnic and 
linguistic 
discrimination 
2 4 2 3 
Farmer/grazer conflict 2 5 2 4 
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Poor governance and 
corruption 
4 4 4 5 
Ongoing 
conflict/terrorism in 
neighboring countries 
3 3 2 3 
Fragile livelihoods and unsafe conditions Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Natural 
resources 
Lack of arable land 1 4 1 5 
Lack of water 1 3 3 1 
Lack of crop diversity 3 3 3 5 
Physical 
resources 
Dangerous location 5 5 4 3 
Poor infrastructure 4 4 4 5 
Human 
resources 
Fragile health 3 3 3 4 
Limited skills and 
formal education 
4 5 4 4 
Social resources 
Marginalized groups or 
individuals 
3 4 3 5 
Limited social 
networks 
5 5 5 5 
Economic 
resources 
Poor access to market 3 4 3 5 
Low income levels 3 5 4 5 
Limited access to  
formal credit 
4 5 5 5 
Lack of job diversity 
and opportunities 
2 4 3 4 
Political 
resources 
Lack of disaster 
preparedness 
4 4 4 4 
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Poor social protection 5 5 5 5 
Poor 
government/communit
y relationship/trust 
3 5 3 3 
Total 89 116 93 115 
Average (mean) 3.30 4.30 3.44 4.26 
 
Considering the vulnerability assessment alone, the survivors in Cha are the most 
vulnerable of the population interviewed for this study. However, this changes once the 
assessment of the gas hazard is taken into account. It should also be noted that 
vulnerability is not constant; it is continually changing as different factors are changed 
or addressed. 
 
4.2 Hazard Analysis 
4.2.1 Scenario Models 
By analyzing the social vulnerability and exposure to the gas hazard a disaster 
risk profile can be created for the villages in the Nyos area. The social vulnerability of 
many survivors in villages where interviews were conducted has increased since the 
LND. A few improvements have been made in some areas though many still do not 
have sufficient access to basic resources and secure livelihoods. The mapping and 
scenario modeling show that a gas release similar to the LND could affect 
approximately the same number of people as in 1986. In 1986, about 5,700 people 
either died or were affected by the disaster. The population affected by the base model 
created for this study was 3,655 to 5,848 people. There were 731 houses that intersected 
with the LND base model. The modeled scenarios show that even smaller scenarios 
could affect many people if they occurred. Each run of the scenarios also indicates that 
the distance the gas travels has more impact on the potentially affected population than 
the cross-sectional area of the gas. The grade of the valley walls usually lead people to 
build along the valley floor rather than on the slopes. Due to the slope of the valley 
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walls, an increase in the cross-sectional area of the flow would mainly extend 
vertically. This means that the distal extent of the gas flow, which is calculated using 
the average slope of the regression model and which extends horizontally, covers more 
of the populated space. 
Figures 11 - 25 show the 15 modeled scenarios with the gas flow depicted as 
orange polygons and the AOI outline in red. The village of Nyos is affected in every 
scenario, Cha is affected by 14 of the 15 scenarios, Scenarios 4 - 15 affect Subum, and 
Scenarios 5 - 15 affect Buabua. 
 
 
Figure 11: Scenario 1 with 5,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 12: Scenario 2 with 10,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 13: Scenario 3 with 15,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
59 
 
Figure 14: Scenario 4 with 20,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 15: Scenario 5 with 25,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 16: Scenario 6 with 30,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 17: Scenario 7 35,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 18: Scenario 8 with 40,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 19: Scenario 9 with 45,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 20: Scenario 10 with 50,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 21: Scenario 11 with 60,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 22: Scenario 12 with 70,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 23: Scenario 13 with 80,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Figure 24: Scenario 14 with 90,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
 
 
Figure 25: Scenario 15 with 100,000m² cross-sectional area and AOI. 
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Table 2 shows the number of houses and population range affected by each 
modeled scenario. Scenario 1 affects 35 houses and almost 200 people even though it is 
a relatively small gas release scenario. The largest scenario, Scenario 15, could affect as 
many as 14,000 people, some as far as 40km from the lake.  
 
Table 2: Number of houses and population range affected by each modeled scenario. 
Scenario Cross-sectional area Houses affected 
Population 
affected  
(hhs 5-8) 
1 5,000m² 35 175 to 280 
2 10,000m² 119 595 to 952 
3 15,000m² 171 855 to 1,368 
4 20,000m² 243 1,215 to 1,944 
5 25,000m² 457 2,285 to 3,656 
6 30,000m² 480 2,400 to 3,840 
7 35,000m² 530 2,650 to 4,240 
8 40,000m² 552 2,760 to 4,416 
9 45,000m² 747 3,735 to 5,976 
10 50,000m² 808 4,040 to 6,464 
11 60,000m² 1,061 5,305 to 8,488 
12 70,000m² 1,142 5,710 to 9,136 
13 80,000m² 1,226 6,130 to 9,808 
14 90,000m² 1,669 8,345 to 13,352 
15 100,000m² 1,750 8,750 to 14,000 
 
One assumption made when calculating the affected population for each 
scenario was that all of the houses that were mapped are currently occupied. This is one 
of the reasons why the affected population is presented as a range. The other reason is 
to take into account unevenly distributed population; five is the national average 
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household size in Cameroon and eight is the rural average household size (Balgah et al., 
2016). By considering this range of household sizes, the likely best and worst case 
scenarios can be examined. Additionally, for the houses to be considered as affected 
had to intersect with the extent of the actual modeled scenario rather than the 500m 
buffer used for the hazard ranking criteria. This was done so that the potentially 
affected populations were less likely to be overestimated. 
 
4.2.2 Hazard Scenario Ranking 
Each scenario was considered based on severity and ranked from 1 - 5. Table 3 
shows the hazard ranking and criteria used for severity. 
 
Table 3: Hazard ranking and criteria. 
Hazard 
Ranking 
Description of Criteria 
Numerical 
Ranking 
Catastrophic 
Completely covers more than 
one major center of the village. 
5 
Major 
Completely covers one major 
center of the village. 
4 
Moderate 
Intersects with part of the 
village. 
3 
Minor 
Comes within 500m of the 
village without intersecting with 
the village. 
2 
Negligible 
Does not come within 500m of 
the village. 
1 
 
Since probability is an important aspect of hazard assessment and is difficult to 
determine for this hazard, a subjective likelihood was used. Table 4 shows the hazard 
ranking for each village along with the subjective likelihood for each scenario. The 
hazard rankings in Table 4 only include the severity from the hazard ranking criteria. 
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The rankings which include the subjective likelihood are shown in Table 5. When only 
the hazard is considered, Nyos has the highest risk. This is because it is catastrophically 
affected by every modeled scenario, based on the ranking criteria. After Nyos, Cha is 
the most vulnerable village when considering only the hazard risk since it is 
catastrophically affected by all but the first scenario. 
 
Table 4: Ranking of scenarios, based on the 1 - 5 scale of the hazard ranking criteria, 
along with the subjective likelihood used to calculate the composite hazard ranking in 
Table 5. 
Hazard Severity 
Ranking and 
Probability 
Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Likelihood 
(Subjective)  
Scenario 1 5 1 1 1 1.00 
Scenario 2 5 4 1 1 0.95 
Scenario 3 5 5 1 1 0.90 
Scenario 4 5 5 4 2 0.85 
Scenario 5 5 5 5 3 0.75 
Scenario 6 5 5 5 3 0.65 
Scenario 7 5 5 5 3 0.55 
Scenario 8 5 5 5 4 0.45 
Scenario 9 5 5 5 5 0.35 
Scenario 10 5 5 5 5 0.25 
Scenario 11 5 5 5 5 0.15 
Scenario 12 5 5 5 5 0.10 
Scenario 13 5 5 5 5 0.08 
Scenario 14 5 5 5 5 0.05 
Scenario 15 5 5 5 5 0.03 
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When the hazard ranking is combined with the subjective likelihood, Nyos still 
has the highest hazard risk. A subjective likelihood was used because probability is 
very important when assessing hazards and risk but there is a lack of historical data and 
other information that does not allow a probability to be calculated for the gas hazard. 
By using a subjective likelihood, the DR can still consider the likelihood of each 
modeled scenario. 
 
Table 5: Hazard ranking (Severity x Subjective Likelihood). 
Hazard Ranking Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Scenario 1 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Scenario 2 4.8 3.8 1.0 1.0 
Scenario 3 4.5 4.5 0.9 0.9 
Scenario 4 4.3 4.3 3.4 1.7 
Scenario 5 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.3 
Scenario 6 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.0 
Scenario 7 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.7 
Scenario 8 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 
Scenario 9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Scenario 10 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Scenario 11 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Scenario 12 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Scenario 13 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Scenario 14 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Scenario 15 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
4.3 Disaster Risk 
The LND caused affected families the loss of many of their assets, resources, 
and in some cases their entire livelihoods. The results of the modeling show that if any 
of these scenarios was to occur many people could be affected. It is important to 
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consider both the hazard and vulnerability when examining disaster risk. As shown 
above, the most at risk village changes depending on which aspect is focused on. The 
DR presented here considers both assessments. It is important to consider the likelihood 
of a disaster event occurring, however, this is a very complex and little understood 
aspect of this hazard. So, a subjective likelihood was used to provide a composite 
hazard ranking that was also used to calculate DR including likelihood. The disaster 
risk is determined from the vulnerability and hazard analyses and shows which villages 
where survivors are living are at higher risk if any of the modeled scenarios were to 
occur.  
A risk matrix was used to evaluate the disaster risk (Table 6), where the hazard 
and vulnerability rankings were multiplied together. The risk matrix also provides a 
non-numerical representation of the DR for each village. The matrix is color coded with 
green representing low risk, yellow representing medium risk, and red representing 
high risk. One DR is calculated without the subjective likelihood (Table 7) and one is 
calculated which includes the subjective likelihood (Table 8). 
 
Table 6: Matrix used for disaster risk. 
 
 
DR without likelihood: 
DR=H x V, where DR is disaster risk, H is the hazard (severity), and V is the 
vulnerability. 
 
 
Disaster 
Risk Vulnerability 
Hazard 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5
2 2 4 6 8 10
3 3 6 9 12 15
4 4 8 12 16 20
5 5 10 15 20 25
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DR with likelihood: 
DR = H x V, where DR is disaster risk, H is the hazard (severity and likelihood), 
and V is the vulnerability. 
 
Tables 7 and 9 show that as the severity of the hazard increases DR for the LND 
survivors living in the Lake Nyos area also increases. This also shows that without 
considering probability the larger scenarios become the priority for any DRR efforts. 
Due to the nature of the Lake Nyos gas hazard, gas release scenarios quickly become 
catastrophic and without probability the hazard appears to affect the DR more 
significantly than vulnerability. Without considering probability, DRR efforts would 
likely focus on the hazard. Tables 8 and 10 account for probability with the use of the 
subjective likelihood and give a more accurate idea of which combination of hazard and 
vulnerability factors should be the focus of DRR efforts. As the scenarios get larger, 
they become less likely which reduces the overall risk.  
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Table 7: DR ranking, including hazard without likelihood. 
Hazard & Vulnerability Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Scenario 1 16.5 4.3 3.4 4.3 
Scenario 2 16.5 17.2 3.4 4.3 
Scenario 3 16.5 21.5 3.4 4.3 
Scenario 4 16.5 21.5 13.8 8.5 
Scenario 5 16.5 21.5 17.2 12.8 
Scenario 6 16.5 21.5 17.2 12.8 
Scenario 7 16.5 21.5 17.2 12.8 
Scenario 8 16.5 21.5 17.2 17.0 
Scenario 9 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 10 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 11 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 12 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 13 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 14 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
Scenario 15 16.5 21.5 17.2 21.3 
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Table 8: DR ranking, including hazard (severity x likelihood). 
Hazard & Vulnerability 
(including likelihood) 
Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Scenario 1 16.5 4.3 3.4 4.3 
Scenario 2 15.7 16.3 3.3 4.0 
Scenario 3 14.8 19.3 3.1 3.8 
Scenario 4 14.0 18.3 11.7 7.2 
Scenario 5 12.4 16.1 12.9 9.6 
Scenario 6 10.7 14.0 11.2 8.3 
Scenario 7 9.1 11.8 9.5 7.0 
Scenario 8 7.4 9.7 7.8 7.7 
Scenario 9 5.8 7.5 6.0 7.5 
Scenario 10 4.1 5.4 4.3 5.3 
Scenario 11 2.5 3.2 2.6 3.2 
Scenario 12 1.6 2.1 1.7 2.1 
Scenario 13 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.6 
Scenario 14 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 
Scenario 15 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show the disaster risk, non-numerically for each village based 
on the risk matrix classification.  
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Table 9: Disaster risk (without likelihood) in the Nyos area, by village and scenario. 
Disaster Risk Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Scenario 1 High Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 2 High High Medium Medium 
Scenario 3 High High Medium Medium 
Scenario 4 High High High Medium 
Scenario 5 High High High Medium 
Scenario 6 High High High Medium 
Scenario 7 High High High Medium 
Scenario 8 High High High High 
Scenario 9 High High High High 
Scenario 10 High High High High 
Scenario 11 High High High High 
Scenario 12 High High High High 
Scenario 13 High High High High 
Scenario 14 High High High High 
Scenario 15 High High High High 
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Table 10: Disaster risk (with likelihood) in the Nyos area, by village and scenario. 
Disaster Risk Nyos Cha Subum Buabua 
Scenario 1 High Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 2 High High Medium Medium 
Scenario 3 High High Medium Medium 
Scenario 4 High High Medium Medium 
Scenario 5 Medium High Medium Medium 
Scenario 6 Medium High Medium Medium 
Scenario 7 Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 8 Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 9 Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 10 Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Scenario 11 Low Medium Low Medium 
Scenario 12 Low Low Low Low 
Scenario 13 Low Low Low Low 
Scenario 14 Low Low Low Low 
Scenario 15 Low Low Low Low 
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Disaster risk assessments are an integral part of effective disaster risk reduction. 
By assessing local hazards and vulnerability, the deeper causal factors of disaster risk 
can be more effectively addressed. Disaster risk is not a constant state but an ever 
changing, dynamic condition. The disaster risk calculated for this study shows the 
disaster risk in the Lake Nyos area at the time of the study. The results of this study 
show that if an equivalent gas eruption to the LND were to occur today, it would affect 
approximately the same number of people as in 1986. Although this is not likely with 
the degassing system that is in place, it gives an idea of what could happen if the 
system is not maintained. The adapted LAHARZ model utilized in this study seems to 
accurately map the areas that were affected by the LND and possible inundation zones 
for the 15 modeled scenarios. When compared with other models used to map the 1986 
LND gas flow, the adapted LAHARZ model is able to map the flow pattern more 
accurately than some of the more complex models. This model also shows that even a 
relatively small gas release could potentially affect many people, which again 
underlines the importance of considering both the hazard and vulnerability for effective 
and sustainable DRR. 
As long as the degassing system is well maintained the hazard seems to be 
under control. This makes it important to consider additional disaster risk reduction 
efforts in the area in the event that there is a system failure. The survivors in the 
villages and camps near the lake are vulnerable due to a variety of social factors. The 
disaster risk can be reduced by addressing some of these factors. Income and access to 
resources, relationship with government and aid, and social relationships were found to 
have a strong bearing on the socially produced vulnerability in the Lake Nyos area. The 
lack of disaster preparedness, emergency management offices, and first responder 
presence and agency should be addressed. The presence and agency capacity of these 
offices should be increased in order to be more effective and accessible during a 
disaster event. Infrastructure and road improvement would allow first responders and 
response agents to have enhanced access in and out of the area and would also allow 
community members to evacuate more easily. By addressing these factors, disaster 
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response can be made more efficient while also helping to improve local community 
members’ access to physical and social resources. Government/community 
relationships and trust are more difficult to improve and are much more difficult to 
regain once lost. However, to help possibly improve and reduce further impairment of 
these relationships, community participation and input should be utilized and 
considered in future DRR and mitigation efforts. This may improve both community 
understanding of the gas hazard and participation for project efficiency. 
Future research could also help to further clarify the factors that contribute to 
risk, vulnerability, and hazards. A more detailed analysis could be done focusing on the 
general population of the area and could examine what might be done for the survivors 
not living in the Nyos area. This area is also affected by more than just the CO₂ hazard. 
Future studies could focus on one of the other hazards or all the hazards together and 
both qualitative and quantitative risk analyses could also be done for those hazards. 
Interdisciplinary studies and cooperation could also be beneficial in adding to the level 
of knowledge and understanding of the interaction of various social factors and hazards 
in the area. 
 The first piece of disaster preparedness and risk reduction is defining and 
analyzing hazards and vulnerabilities of potentially affected populations. Although all 
hazards and vulnerabilities should be addressed, resources are often limited. In this 
way, conducting hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments, which consider a broad 
range of factors, can be used in establishing priorities on what can and should be 
addressed through disaster risk reduction efforts. As exemplified in this study, it is 
crucial that risk from both hazards and vulnerability be examined. When only one 
aspect is considered, risk reduction and mitigation efforts taken may only partially 
address or may misdiagnose the most significant causal factors and immediate needs of 
a population. By considering risk through the assessment of both vulnerability and 
hazards, the actions taken can more effectively and efficiently reduce disaster risk as 
well as more appropriately integrate with a population’s, community’s, or country’s 
larger development goals. 
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7. Appendix A – Interview Information [IRB project 
#799717-1] 
 
A1. Informed Consent: Oral Model  
English Version 
*Note: Written as it will be read to the participant by the translator. 
Mary Witucki is a graduate student at Michigan Technological University in the United 
States. She is conducting a study at her school to write her thesis and complete her 
master’s degree in Mitigation of Natural Hazards. And I am Useini Musa; I am 
collaborating and translating for this study. We would like to talk to you about the 
Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster 
survivors; in order to find out about how the survivors and the descendants of the 
victims and survivors managed and adapted after the disaster and what they have done 
to protect themselves from future disasters. Your participation in this study is 
completely voluntary. There is no compensation for participation in this study. The 
interview will take between thirty minutes and one hour though it may run longer if you 
so choose. We would like to tape record our conversation, so that we can accurately 
record your responses. You may ask us to turn the machine off or back on again 
according to your comfort. 
You may ask us questions at any time and talk about things you think we should know 
about, even if we don’t ask. You should feel free to interrupt us if you want to ask 
questions about the Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake 
Nyos Disaster survivors. You are not required to talk to us or to answer our questions. 
Even if you decide now to talk to us, you may later ask us to stop asking you about it. 
You may stop participating at any time. Nothing bad will happen to you or to us if you 
decide not to answer our questions. 
We will not reveal anything that you say to us beyond anyone helping us with the study 
whom we trust to maintain your confidentiality. We will do everything we can to 
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protect your privacy, but there is always a slight chance that someone could find out 
about our conversation. 
We are asking if you would agree to participate in this study, and to talk to us about the 
Grassroots Strategies of Relief and Adaptation of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster 
survivors. Do you agree to participate? Will you allow us to record our conversation? 
 
A2. Interview Questions 
English Version 
Getting to know the interviewee: 
1) Are you a survivor of the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster or a relative of a victim of the 
disaster? 
a. Where were you living at the time of the disaster? 
2) About how old are you? 
Awareness of: 
Disaster- 
3) Can you tell me about what happened during the 1986 Lake Nyos Disaster? 
a. What do you think caused the disaster? 
b. Do you consider Lake Nyos to be dangerous? Why or why not? 
Government activities- 
4) Can you tell me about what the government did and has done, if anything, since the 
disaster? 
a. Are they still doing anything or have they done anything recently? 
Other activities- 
5) What can you tell me about government or other activities, if any, that have been 
going on at the lake since the disaster? 
a. If there have been activities, have any been going on recently or are any going on 
currently? 
6) Have you been back to the disaster zone since the disaster happened? 
a. Why or why not? 
b. Would you like to move back there if you had the opportunity? 
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After/since 1986 LND: 
Response/Relief/Adaptation- 
7) What did you, personally, do or what did your family and your community do when 
the disaster happened? 
a. What prompted you to do those things? 
8) What did you, personally, do or what did your family and your community do to 
manage and to restart after the disaster? 
a. Why did you decide to do those things rather than something else? 
b. Do you feel that you and/or your family have been able to recover from the 
disaster? 
Preparation/Adaptation/Risk and Vulnerability Reduction- 
9) Is there anything that you or your family and your community have done to prepare 
for future natural hazards or disasters?  
a. If yes, what? If no, why not? 
b. How did you come to make those decisions? 
c. Due to those preparations, do you feel that you, your family, and your community 
could better handle a natural hazard or disaster now? 
10) What, if anything, have you been doing to make sure that you are not as affected if 
another disaster happens? 
a. What prompted you to decide to do those things? 
b. If no, why have you decided not to do anything? 
Closing: 
Is there any more information that you feel would be relevant to our research? 
Are there some people that you think might be willing and useful for us to talk to? 
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8. Appendix B – Copyright Permissions 
B1. Permission for Use for Figure 3. 
 
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> 
 
(no subject) 
2 messages 
 
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:19 PM 
To: ochavisual@un.org 
Mary Witucki 
mwitucki@mtu.edu 
 
 
12/05/2018 
 
ochavisual@un.org 
 
To whom it may concern: 
I would like to ask your permission to use the following image in my master’s thesis concerning 
natural hazards in Cameroon.  
 
Cameroon: Location Map (2013) 
 
 
My name is Mary Witucki and I am a master’s student at Michigan Technological University. I am 
writing my thesis on disaster risk and natural hazards in Cameroon. I would like to use this image in 
my work, with full credit. 
If you agree with the terms as described above, please sign and return the letter to me, specifying any 
credit line, fees, or other conditions you require. Your signing of this letter confirms that you own the 
copyright to the above described material. If you do not currently hold the rights, I would appreciate 
any information that can help me contact the rights holder. 
I would be very grateful for your permission. If you require any additional information, do not 
hesitate to contact me at mwitucki@mtu.edu. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
 
OCHA-Visual <ochavisual@un.org> Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 9:23 AM 
To: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> 
Dear Mary, 
Thank you for your inquiry. You are hereby granted non-exclusive rights subject to the 
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conditions below to republish the following OCHA map: 
  
‘Cameroon: Location Map (2013)’ 
Available at https://reliefweb.int/map/cameroon/cameroon-location-map-2013 
And in attachment 
In your thesis on disaster risk and natural hazards in Cameroon. 
The following conditions apply: 
1. OCHA maps must be republished in their original form and cannot be modified without the 
express permission of OCHA. Modification includes, without limitation, removing, resizing, or 
otherwise altering a map's title, contents, legend, symbology, acknowledgements, 
attributions, or disclaimers. An OCHA map may be reduced in size at the discretion of the 
Requestor provided the original spatial proportions are maintained. 
2. The following attribution ("Attribution") must accompany OCHA maps: "Map provided 
courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs". The Attribution must 
be clearly readable. The Attribution may appear alongside the map or elsewhere in the 
publication, so long as a link to the Attribution on pages where an OCHA map appears is 
provided. 
3. The following disclaimer ("Disclaimer") is clearly readable on each page where an OCHA 
map appears: "The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map 
do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations". Should the 
Requestor reduce the size of the map so that the Disclaimer appearing in the map is no 
longer clearly readable, the text of the Disclaimer must be reproduced and appear alongside 
the map. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at ochavisual@un.org. 
Kind regards, 
Design and Multimedia Unit 
Strategic Communications Branch 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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B2. Permission of Use for Bang (2010, 2016). 
 
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> 
 
Request for permission to cite and quote 
3 messages 
 
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM 
To: hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Bcc: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> 
Mary Witucki 
mwitucki@mtu.edu 
 
 
11/18/2018 
Dr. Henry Bang 
hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Dorset House D236, Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, Poole, BH12 5BB  
 
Dr. Bang, 
I would like to ask your permission to cite and quote your following publications, with full credit (no 
figures, charts, graphs, tables, photos/pictures, or illustrations will be used): 
 
Bang, H., 2010. Natural Disaster Risk, Vulnerability and Resettlement: Relocation Decisions 
following the Lake Nyos and Monoum Disasters in Cameroon. PhD Thesis. School of International 
Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 
Bang, H., 2016. 30 Years After the Lake Nyos Disaster: What Prospects for Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration in the Region? Disaster Management, Social Vulnerability, Risk Perception and 
Relocation Decisions in Cameroon. US: Book Venture Publishing.  
 
My name is Mary Witucki and I am a masters student at Michigan Technological University. I am 
writing my thesis on disaster risk and I am examining the Lake Nyos area and the 1986 Lake Nyos 
Disaster as a case study. Your many works on the subject have been very helpful in aiding my 
understanding of the topic. I would like to include citations and quotations from the above material in 
my thesis, with full credit. 
If you agree with the terms as described above, please sign and return the letter to me, specifying any 
credit line, fees, or other conditions you require. Your signing of this letter confirms that you own the 
copyright to the above described material. If you do not currently hold the rights, I would appreciate 
any information that can help me contact the rights holder. 
I would be very grateful for your permission. If you require any additional information, do not 
hesitate to contact me at mwitucki@mtu.edu. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Mary Witucki 
mwitucki@mtu.edu 
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Henry Bang <hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk> Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:35 AM 
To: Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> 
Hi Mary,  
Thanks for your mail.  
I hold the copyrights for both materials and grant you permission to use them.  
Regards! 
Henry 
Dr Henry N Bang (BSc, MSc, MSc, PhD) 
Research Fellow/Lecturer 
Disaster Management Centre  
Bournemouth University 
Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, 
Poole, Dorset,  
BH12 5BB 
United Kingdom 
Email: hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Phone: +44 (0) 1202966307  
 
 
Mary Witucki <mwitucki@mtu.edu> Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:40 AM 
To: Henry Bang <hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk> 
Dr. Bang, 
 
   Thank you so much! I really enjoy and am inspired by your work. I am so grateful for your 
allowing me to use them! 
 
Sincerely, 
Mary Witucki 
mwitucki@mtu.edu 
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B3. Copyright Information for Wisner et al. (2004). 
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B4. Fair Evaluation Documentation for Wisner et al. (2012). 
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